Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws by Rogus, Caroline
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 
Volume 21 Issue 1 
2014 
Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of 
Our Paternity Laws 
Caroline Rogus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the 
Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67 (2014). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol21/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Gender & Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
F I G H T I N G  T H E  E S T A B L I S H M E N T :
T H E  N E E D  F O R  P R O C E D U R A L  R E F O R M
O F  O U R  P A T E R N I T Y  L A W S
aroline ogus*
ABSTRACT
Every state and the District of Columbia use voluntary ac-
knowledgments of paternity. Created pursuant to federal law, the
acknowledgment is signed by the purported biological parents and
establishes paternity without requiring court involvement. Intended
to be a “simple civil process” to establish paternity where the parents
are unmarried, the acknowledgment is used by state governments to
expedite child support litigation. But federal policy and state laws
governing the acknowledgments do not sufficiently protect the inter-
ests of those men who have signed acknowledgments and who subse-
quently discover that they lack genetic ties to the children in
question. A signatory who learns that he is not the child’s biological
father and who wishes to challenge the validity of the acknowledg-
ment must navigate a difficult process for relief. The very act of
signing an acknowledgment may subsequently prevent him from of-
fering any scientific evidence of the absence of a biological connec-
tion to the child. As a result, he may be obligated to pay child
support for years on the basis of that erroneous paternity acknowl-
edgment, and a parent-child relationship may be imposed even if it
is not in the child’s best interests.
Using the District of Columbia as a model to highlight the
need for procedural reform, this Article examines the federal and
D.C. legislation that created voluntary acknowledgments of pater-
nity as well as the process for either rescinding or challenging their
validity. The Article then analyzes the practical implications of these
processes and discusses why the presumptive weight of the acknowl-
edgment, a conclusive presumption of paternity, is problematic. In
particular, the Article questions the need for a conclusive presump-
tion of paternity, a difficult evidentiary burden for a challenger to
overcome, and whether the conclusive presumption of paternity runs
afoul of constitutional protections. Finally, the Article offers possible
solutions to improve the establishment process.
* B.A., May 1999 Wellesley College; J.D., May 2003 University of Pennsylvania Law
School; LL.M, August 2013, The George Washington University Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
A man meets a woman. They date. The woman informs the man that
she is pregnant. Almost immediately after the child’s birth, the man is given
a document to sign by the hospital staff. The document states that the sig-
natories swear that they are the biological parents of the child. Believing that
this is an accurate statement, the man signs the document. Although the
man and woman separate, the man stays involved in the child’s life. Then
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he discovers that the child’s mother has told other family members that he is
not the child’s biological father. Unsettled by the news, he and the child
submit to genetic testing. The test results exclude the man as the child’s
biological father.
Some years later, the man is served with notice that the government
has brought suit for paternity and child support to recover public benefits
spent on the child’s behalf. Through this lawsuit the man finally learns that
the document he had signed years ago at the hospital, a document known as
an acknowledgment of paternity, is the basis for the government’s conten-
tion that he is responsible for the child’s welfare. Referencing the local pa-
ternity laws, the government argues that the existence of the
acknowledgment is sufficient to establish the man’s paternity and that the
subsequent genetic test results are inadmissible.1
Every state and the District of Columbia use a voluntary acknowledg-
ment of paternity. Created pursuant to federal law, the acknowledgment
may be a single piece of paper used to establish paternity without the need
for court intervention.2 These acknowledgments are made available to un-
married individuals at public hospitals and government agencies.3 By sign-
ing the acknowledgment, the signatories swear that they are the biological
parents of the minor child.
The acknowledgment establishes parentage in situations where there is
no other definitive evidence of the father’s identity. Where the father and
mother were married at the time of the child’s conception or birth, there is
a marital presumption that they are the parents of that child.4 However,
1. In order to both protect the privacy of the individuals in specific paternity cases and
highlight some of the pitfalls of establishing paternity by an acknowledgment of
paternity, this story is a composite of the facts in several cases before the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia. As discussed in this Article, the D.C. government
has argued that a signed acknowledgment of paternity is sufficient to establish pater-
nity pursuant to D.C. law, regardless of the acknowledgment’s biological accuracy.
See infra Parts I.B, II.B.
2. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards:
More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 70–88
(2010) (surveying various states’ paternity acknowledgments).
3. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013) (hospital-based program for the vol-
untary acknowledgment of paternity); D.C. CODE § 16-909.03 (Westlaw through
Oct. 16, 2013) (voluntary paternity acknowledgment program for birthing hospi-
tals); § 16-909.04 (Westlaw) (voluntary paternity acknowledgment program for
birth records agency); see also § 16-909.05 (Westlaw) (authorizing mayor to desig-
nate other sites for paternity acknowledgment program).
4. D.C. CODE § 16-909(a)(1) (Westlaw) (providing, in relevant part, that there is a
“presumption that a man is the father of a child . . . if he and the child’s mother are
or have been married . . . at the time of either conception or birth, or between
conception and birth, and the child is born during the marriage . . . or within 300
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where the parents are unmarried, there is an identity crisis: “Without the
law of marriage, we do not know who the parents are.”5 Because the woman
who bears and delivers the child is virtually always the child’s biological
mother,6 the dilemma becomes determining the identity of the child’s fa-
ther when the parents are not married. Where, as in D.C., there are
thousands of children born to unmarried women every year,7 there are po-
tentially thousands of unidentified fathers.
Intended to be a “simple civil process” to establish paternity where the
parents are unmarried,8 the acknowledgment is wielded as an evidentiary
tool to expedite child support and paternity litigation. But when that pro-
cess breaks down, the result is neither simple nor civil. Federal policy incen-
tivizes state governments to maintain high rates of paternity establishment.9
In D.C., the Office of the Attorney General—the entity that prosecutes
paternity and support cases—opposes genetic testing. When such testing
has already been performed and excludes the male signatory as the father,
they argue that those test results are irrelevant and inadmissible.10
days after the termination of marital cohabitation by reason of death, annulment,
divorce, or separation ordered by a court”).
5. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 651 (2008).
6. “The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is
clear.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 260 n.16 (1983).
7. In 2010, 5,019 children were born to unmarried women in the District of Colum-
bia. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS: FINAL
DATA FOR 2010, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS Vol. 61, No. 1 tbl.I-4
(2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_01_tables
.pdf.
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See, e.g., District of Columbia ex rel. D.H. v. D.H., 140 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2117,
2118 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2012) (government argued that the lower court’s use
of paternity test results to dismiss a petition for paternity and support was erroneous
because “paternity test results are irrelevant” where a signed acknowledgment exists);
District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933, 933
(D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (ordering genetic testing “over the objection of the
District of Columbia”); G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 2010) (government opposed putative father’s request for genetic test-
ing, taking the position that “[b]ecause Respondent signed an Acknowledgment of
Paternity at the hospital . . . paternity has been established and Respondent is now
prohibited from seeking a review of the issue of paternity.”); District of Columbia ex
rel. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2008)
(ordering paternity test “[n]otwithstanding the District of Columbia’s objection” in
a case where signatory to an acknowledgment challenged paternity); see also M.M. v.
T-M.M., 995 A.2d 164, 164–66 (D.C. 2010) (affirming denial of motion for relief
from an order of paternity and permanent child support where putative father signed
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According to the D.C. government, the existence of a voluntary ac-
knowledgment establishes conclusively a father-child relationship in these
cases; any further fact-finding about the man’s biological relationship with
the child is inappropriate. Therefore, a signatory who is not the child’s bio-
logical father and who wishes to challenge the validity of the acknowledg-
ment faces a procedural nightmare. He must navigate increasingly difficult
burdens to have his challenge heard and may be formally barred altogether
from introducing genetic test results as a justification for his challenge to his
prior erroneous acknowledgment.
Because federal policy essentially mandates the use of these acknowl-
edgments, the states have similar—if not identical—laws on using and chal-
lenging paternity acknowledgments.11 This Article will focus on the laws
paternity acknowledgment, notwithstanding that court-ordered paternity testing ex-
cluded him as biological father); Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C.
Super. LEXIS 8, at *6 (D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008) (government
argued that paternity challenge filed by putative father who had obtained genetic test
results on his own was time-barred from seeking relief); W.F. v. K.J., 128 DAILY
WASH. L. REP. 1045, 1045 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1999) (responding to putative
father’s obtainment of DNA test results on his own, the Government argued that
“the competing jurisdictions of res judicata and the ‘final judgment rule’ preclude
such a tardy request to vacate a long-standing judgment of paternity, biology (or
anything else) notwithstanding.” (emphasis in original)).
11. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. Acts of the
2013 Jan. Reg. Sess. of Conn. Gen. Assemb.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-308-
8-309 (Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013, chs. 1–185); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-46.1
(Westlaw through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-3.5
(Westlaw through Act 4 [end] of the 2013 2d Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-
1106 (Westlaw through End of the 2013 1st Reg Sess. of the 62d Leg.); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1616 (Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec.
Sess. of the 62d Leg.); MD. CODE ANN, FAM. LAW § 5-1028 (Westlaw through all
chs. of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C,
§ 11 (Westlaw through Ch. 195 of the 1st Ann. Sess. 2013); MISS. CODE. ANN.
§ 93-9-9 (Westlaw through End of 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st & 2d Ex. Sess.); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1409 (Westlaw through End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-308 (Westlaw through Ch. 228 [end] of the 2013 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 51st Leg.); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE. ANN. § 14-20-18 (Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63d Legis.
Assemb.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7700-308 (Westlaw through Ch. 23 [end] of
the 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 54th Leg. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070
(Westlaw through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and Spec. Sess.); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5103 (Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 2013-88, 91, 93–97, 99–103, except 20
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7101 to end 2013–14); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-3
(Westlaw through Ch. 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-50
(Westlaw through End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308
(Westlaw through end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d Leg.); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 307 (Westlaw through 1st Sess. of the 2013-14 Vt. Gen. Assemb.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Westlaw through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the End of
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and procedures in the District of Columbia to provide a framework for
examining the federal policies on paternity establishment and their local
impact on the process for challenging paternity acknowledgments.
The District’s laws and procedures are fairly typical of state statutes on
challenging acknowledgments, but some key differences in states’ ap-
proaches will be noted throughout the Article. By providing a close-up ex-
amination of how one jurisdiction attempts to balance the interests involved
in paternity establishment, this Article will underscore the procedural short-
comings for the disestablishment of paternity. In particular, the Article ad-
dresses the ways in which the interests of unmarried men may be
marginalized in the government’s rush to establish paternity and secure per-
manent child support orders as quickly as possible.
In Part I, this Article examines the federal and D.C. legislation that
creates acknowledgments of paternity. Part II analyzes the process for either
rescinding or challenging the validity of those acknowledgments. Part III
discusses why a conclusive presumption of paternity is of particular impor-
tance for those wishing to invalidate an acknowledgment. Part IV proposes
some solutions to improve the establishment of paternity process, such as
eliminating the conclusive presumption and replacing it with a rebuttable
presumption of paternity. While biology should not be considered the only
basis for a parent-child relationship, it is an important element of parentage
in our society and should be included in a court’s analysis of whether a
parent-child relationship exists in these paternity cases. A paternity acknowl-
edgment should not nullify the relevance of biology.
I. THE CREATION OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY
Fatherlessness poses a problem for state governments.12 The federal
government has identified the absence of fathers from family units as a
“growing crisis” for young people across the country.13 In D.C., fatherless-
the 2013 Spec. Sess. I.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.330 (Westlaw through
2013 Legis.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-608 (Westlaw through 2013 Gen. Sess.).
Many of these state laws are based on the relevant provisions of the Uniform Parent-
age Act (2000). See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 307-309 (amended 2002).
12. For the sake of simplicity, the term “state governments” is used throughout the Arti-
cle to refer to state governments as well as the government of the District of
Columbia.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., The President’s Fatherhood Pledge, NAT’L
RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.fatherhood.gov/pledge
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014); see also Proclamation No. 8839, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,259,
37,259 (June 15, 2012) (“Every father bears a fundamental obligation to do right by
their children. Yet, today, too many young Americans grow up without the love and
support of their fathers. When the responsibilities of fathers go unmet, our commu-
nities suffer.”).
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ness is a fact of life in communities struggling with poverty. Based on a
recent survey, more than three-quarters of the households with children in
D.C.’s poorest neighborhoods identify as families headed by women.14
Children of such single-parent families are more likely to do poorly in
school, have emotional problems, become teenage parents, and have pov-
erty-level incomes as adults as compared to their cohorts in dual-parent
families.15
Research indicates that a father’s economic contributions, such as
child support “play an important role in helping children avoid poverty.”16
Unsurprisingly, the federal government has established programs to incen-
tivize fathers to become or stay involved in their children’s lives. Recently,
the Obama administration appropriated $75 million to award funds for ac-
tivities promoting responsible fatherhood.17 The D.C. government created
some progressive initiatives to support and integrate fathers into family life.
In 2007, the D.C. Superior Court’s Family Court launched the Family Fa-
thering Court Initiative to help fathers released from incarceration re-enter
their communities and families.18 The 2011 Annual Interdisciplinary Con-
ference sponsored by D.C. Superior Court’s Family Court addressed con-
14. URBAN INST. & D.C. LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT, DC Ward Profiles,
NEIGHBORHOODINFO DC (Nov. 26 2013), http://www.neighborhoodinfodc.org/
wards/wards.html. These two wards, Wards 7 and 8, also have the highest rates of
poverty and unemployment in the District. URBAN INST. & D.C. LOCAL INITIA-
TIVES SUPPORT, 2012 Ward Comparison Table, NEIGHBORHOODINFO DC (Feb. 18,
2014), http://www.neighborhoodinfodc.org/comparisontables/comparisontables
.html.
15. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31025, FATHERHOOD INI-
TIATIVES: CONNECTING FATHERS TO THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2014). A D.C. magis-
trate judge went so far as to blame households in which children did not know their
fathers for “the almost inexorable appearance of too many such children in the New
Referrals, Misdemeanor, and Felony Branches.” W.F., 128 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at
1070.
16. Maria Cancian et al., Child Support: Responsible Fatherhood and the Quid Pro Quo,
635 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 143 (2011).
17. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41431, CHILD
WELL-BEING AND NONCUSTODIAL FATHERS 39 (2013). The Responsible Father-
hood grant program’s funding was extended at that same funding level from Fiscal
Year 2011 through March 2013. Id.
18. Fathering Court Initiatives (Fathering Reentry Court), D.C. CTS., http://www.dc-
courts.gov/internet/superior/org_family/fatheringcourt.jsf (last visited Apr. 14,
2014); see also Petula Dvorak, D.C. Court Program Teaches Absent Fathers How to Be
Good Dads, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/07/AR2011020705927.html.
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cerns of fathers in the District and was entitled, “Empowering Fathers: One
Size Does Not Fit All.”19
The proactive stance of the D.C. government on issues of fatherhood
has its limits, however. Unlike most areas of family law that are governed
exclusively by state law, a patchwork of federal statutes lays the groundwork
for establishment of paternity. D.C. and state laws then implement federal
policy on paternity and support in their respective jurisdictions. D.C. and
other jurisdictions often take an aggressive approach in prosecuting non-
custodial fathers in paternity and support cases because, as discussed below,
federal law incentivizes jurisdictions to expedite the paternity establishment
process.
A. Federal Policy on Paternity Establishment
The parents of a minor child share legal responsibility for the support
of their child.20 The custodial parent is presumed to financially support the
child by providing the child with shelter, food, and other aspects of caregiv-
ing.21 Although a custodial parent is entitled to sue the other parent for
support owed to the minor child, where the custodial parent receives public
benefits such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or Medi-
caid on behalf of the child, she must assign to the state government the right
to sue for child support.22 If the state government has distributed public
benefits on behalf of a child, federal law permits the state government to
retain as reimbursement for those benefits a portion of the child support
money paid by a non-custodial parent.23 The possibility of recovering these
funds incentivizes the state government to seek and secure as many support
orders as possible against non-custodial parents of children receiving public
benefits. Before the state government can secure a permanent child support
order, it must first establish the identity of the child’s parents to determine
who, if anyone, owes child support to the custodial parent and the govern-
19. Welcome to the 2011 Family Court Interdisciplinary Conference, FAM. CT. D.C. SUPE-
RIOR CT., http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/system/headlines/2011_family_court_
conference/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
20. D.C. CODE § 16-916.01(c)(1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
21. Where one parent has primary physical custody of the child, he or she is presumed
to spend their share of the child support directly on the child. § 16-916.01(f)(1)(D)
(Westlaw).
22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(3) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding 113–54 and
113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013). In D.C., this assignment of the right to sue does
not apply to the first $150 of child support received by the custodial parent every
month. D.C. CODE § 4-905.19(c)(5) (Westlaw). Accordingly, that initial $150 is
not acquired by the government but instead is “passed through” from the non-custo-
dial parent to the custodial parent.
23. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654(5), 657 (Westlaw).
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ment. It is in this way that the state government becomes involved in the
business of establishing paternity.
D.C. and the states could lose significant federal funding if they fail to
comply with federal laws on paternity establishment. D.C. and other juris-
dictions must have a process for establishing paternity if they wish to receive
federal funding for their public assistance programs.24 Such funding is re-
ferred to as IV-D funding after the section of the Social Security Act outlin-
ing state requirements for child support and paternity establishment.25 The
Family Support Act of 1988 penalized states that did not establish paternity
for a certain number of public benefits cases.26 However, the 1988 Act did
not mandate the use of an acknowledgement of paternity. Instead, the Act
“encouraged”—but did not require—the states “to establish and implement
a simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity and a civil
procedure for establishing paternity in contested cases.”27
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) amended
the federal statute on paternity establishment in critical ways. Most germane
to this Article, OBRA required any states receiving IV-D funding to estab-
lish procedures “for a simple civil process for voluntarily acknowledging pa-
ternity under which the State must provide that the rights and
responsibilities of acknowledging paternity are explained and ensure that
due process safeguards are afforded.”28 The legislation further instructed the
states to create voluntary acknowledgement procedures that create a rebutta-
ble or, “at the option of the State, conclusive presumption of paternity.”29
Finally, the Act required procedures “under which the voluntary acknowl-
edgment of paternity must be recognized as a basis for seeking a support
order without requiring any further proceedings to establish paternity.”30
24. See §§ 652(g), 654(4)(A) (Westlaw). Note that federal law requires states and the
District of Columbia to offer any individual the service of establishing paternity and
obtaining a permanent support order, regardless of whether he or she receives public
benefits. See § 654(4)(A)(ii), (B) (Westlaw).
25. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Westlaw through P.L. 113–72 (excluding P.L. 113–66 and
113–67) approved Dec. 26, 2013).
26. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 111, 102 Stat. 2343,
2348–50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
27. § 111(c), 102 Stat. at 2350 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 668).
28. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13721(b)(2)(C), 107 Stat. 312, 659 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666).
29. § 13721(b)(2)(D), 107 Stat. at 659. The states were given the same options with
respect to genetic test results: they could either establish a conclusive or rebuttable
presumption of paternity. See § 13721(b)(2)(G), 107 Stat. at 659.
30. § 13721(b)(2)(E), 107 Stat. at 659.
76 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 21:67
Thus, the 1993 Act made acknowledgments of paternity obligatory, rather
than merely encouraged as under the Family Act of 1988.31
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) overhauled the entire welfare system. One of the
goals of the 1996 legislation was to “greatly increase paternity establish-
ment.”32 PRWORA mandated that a state’s paternity establishment percent-
age must increase at a predetermined rate lest the state be found in non-
compliance with the law and, consequently, at risk for losing federal fund-
ing for its IV-D programs.33 Conversely, PRWORA rewarded those states
that increased their rates of paternity establishment.34 PRWORA also re-
31. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 668 (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding 113–54 and
113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013) (encouraging states to adopt a civil procedure for
establishing paternity).
32. Oversight of the Child Support Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Res. of the H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) [hereinafter
Child Support Enforcement Program Hearing] (statement of Rep. Johnson, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Human Res.).
33. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(g) (Westlaw). The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) A State’s program under this part shall be found, for purposes of sec-
tion 609(a)(8) of this title, not to have complied substantially with the
requirements of this part unless, for any fiscal year beginning on or after
October 1, 1994, its paternity establishment percentage for such fiscal year
is based on reliable data and (rounded to the nearest whole percentage
point) equals or exceeds—
(A) 90 percent;
(B) for a State with a paternity establishment percentage of not less than 75
percent but less than 90 percent for such fiscal year, the paternity establish-
ment percentage of the State for the immediately preceding fiscal year plus
2 percentage points;
(C) for a State with a paternity establishment percentage of not less than
50 percent but less than 75 percent for such fiscal year, the paternity estab-
lishment percentage of the State for the immediately preceding fiscal year
plus 3 percentage points;
(D) for a State with a paternity establishment percentage of not less than
45 percent but less than 50 percent for such fiscal year, the paternity estab-
lishment percentage of the State for the immediately preceding fiscal year
plus 4 percentage points;
(E) for a State with a paternity establishment percentage of not less than 40
percent but less than 45 percent for such fiscal year, the paternity establish-
ment percentage of the State for the immediately preceding fiscal year plus
5 percentage points; or
(F) for a State with a paternity establishment percentage of less than 40
percent for such fiscal year, the paternity establishment percentage of the
State for the immediately preceding fiscal year plus 6 percentage points.
Id.
34. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 341, 110 Stat. 2105, 2231 (codified as amended at 42
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quired that states have a hospital-based program for the voluntary acknowl-
edgment of paternity “immediately before or after the birth of a child.”35
With these provisions, the federal government’s message to state govern-
ments was loud and clear: prioritize the easy establishment of paternity or
risk losing federal financial assistance.
OBRA’s provision that participating states must give the voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity either a rebuttable or conclusive presumption
of paternity was not included in the legislative revisions of PRWORA. Con-
sequently, the current version of the relevant federal law, 42 U.S.C
§ 666(a)(5), does not mention a presumption of paternity based on an ac-
knowledgment. Nonetheless, the laws of D.C. and the states do attach a
presumption to the acknowledgment.36 PRWORA requires only that D.C.
and the states have procedures to ensure that an executed acknowledgment
constitutes a “legal finding of paternity.”37
The impact of this language may be no different than the effect of a
conclusive presumption. At least one federal entity’s interpretation of
PRWORA is that a paternity acknowledgment establishes a conclusive pre-
sumption of paternity. In a report regarding the use of voluntary acknowl-
edgments, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services (OIG) stated, “[f]ederal law dictates that a voluntary
paternity acknowledgment creates a conclusive finding of paternity.”38 Else-
where in the report, the OIG noted that some state agencies and courts were
reluctant to attach a conclusive finding of paternity to the acknowledg-
U.S.C. § 668); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 658(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–72 (ex-
cluding P.L. 113–66 and 113–67) approved Dec. 26, 2013) (providing incentive
payments to states based on, inter alia, the state’s “paternity establishment perform-
ance level”).
35. PRWORA § 331(a)(5)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. 2105, 2228 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 666).
36. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L. 113–54
and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013); see infra Part II.B.
37. § 666(a)(5) (Westlaw).
38. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PATER-
NITY ESTABLISHMENT: USE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS,
OEI-06-98-00053 1 (2000) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF
VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS]. The report cites to the aforemen-
tioned provision on acknowledgments of the Social Security Act, as amended by
PRWORA and other laws. See id. at 1,16 n.2; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT: ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL METHODS, OEI-06-98-00050 15 (2000) [hereinafter OF-
FICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL METHODS] (stating
that a signed voluntary paternity acknowledgment is “[f]ederally mandated to stand
on its own as a conclusive finding of paternity.”).
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ment.39 The OIG recommended that the Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment encourage state child support agencies “to inform State and local
courts regarding the legality of acknowledgments as conclusive findings of
paternity and work more closely with State legal entities to ensure adherence
to Federal law.”40
B. Effectuating Federal Policy Through Local Laws
In D.C., written paternity acknowledgments have existed since the
1970s,41 but over twenty years passed before the District of Columbia Pater-
nity Establishment Act of 199142 codified what a written acknowledgment
was. That law provided that paternity could be established by “a written
statement of the father and mother made under oath that acknowledges
paternity.”43 Perhaps reflecting the District’s desire to locate as many fathers
as possible, the legislation changed the burden of proof for disproving pater-
nity, ratcheting the burden up from a preponderance of the evidence to
clear and convincing evidence.44 The burden of proof for establishing pater-
39. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWL-
EDGEMENTS, supra note 38, at 12.
40. Id. at 14.
41. The District of Columbia Marriage and Divorce Act of 1976 provided that a child’s
relationship to her father was established “by proving by a preponderance of evidence
that he is the father,” and stated that such a presumption of fatherhood existed
where the putative father has acknowledged paternity in writing. District of Colum-
bia Marriage and Divorce Act, tit. I, § 106, 23 D.C. Reg. 5869, 5874 (Feb. 11,
1977) (amended 1989). This provision has since been revised to provide that the
father-child relationship is established either by adjudication or by an “unrebutted
presumption,” including the presumption created where paternity is acknowledged
in writing. D.C. CODE § 16-909(a)(4) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013). It is not
clear from the language of the D.C. Code whether the “writing” referred to in this
provision includes an acknowledgement of paternity that is provided for in a differ-
ent statutory provision, section 16-909(b-1) of the D.C. Code, or whether the writ-
ing referenced in section 16-909(a)(4) is something else altogether: a written
document in which a man attests to his paternity, but which does not have the
requisite elements of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as set forth in section
16-909.01(a)(1). See § 16-909.01(a)(1) (Westlaw); see infra Part III.C (further dis-
cussion of § 16-909).
42. District of Columbia Paternity Establishment Act of 1991, § 2, 38 D.C. Reg. 4970
(July 24, 1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections in titles 13, 16, and 30 of
the D.C. Code).
43. § 2(d) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 16-909.01, formerly cited as § 16-
909.1). The statute also provided that a written agreement between the father and
mother made under oath that “binds the putative father and mother to the results of
a genetic test” will establish paternity. Id.
44. § 2(c).
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nity, however, remained at the less burdensome preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.45 These burdens of proof remain in effect today.46
The legislative history accompanying the 1991 Paternity Establish-
ment Act sheds light on the financial burdens that the District was facing
with respect to its paternity caseload. The law was intended to “simplify and
streamline the District’s paternity determination process,” according to the
D.C. Council’s Committee on the Judiciary.47 The Committee Report
stated that the District’s Office of Paternity and Child Support Enforce-
ment had a backlog of cases, including “approximately 20,000 such cases
where paternity ha[d] not been established.”48 In order to meet federal stan-
dards for processing child support cases, and thereby avoid the withholding
of federal funds as a penalty, the Committee advised that establishing pater-
nity by voluntary acknowledgement would help process child support cases
in a timely fashion.49 Voluntary acknowledgments would replace “time-con-
suming and expensive procedures” used to adjudicate paternity, which in-
cluded service of process, discovery, pretrial hearings, and trials.50
The Committee noted that establishing paternity “is the first step to-
wards obtaining child support in the District,” and therefore, the proposed
legislation would help children receive financial support.51 However, it also
acknowledged that the government had a monetary interest in clearing its
logjam of support cases: the possibility of not only avoiding a penalty but
also receiving additional federal funds as incentive payments.52 The Com-
mittee Report underscores the legislature’s competing goals. Although the
Council demonstrated concern for the well-being of minor children, it was
also aware of the risk of losing federal funding for its public benefits pro-
grams. Calculations of this financial risk—and of the methods needed to
secure a high rate of paternity establishment—were reflected in the resulting
legislation.
II. CHALLENGING THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
There are three methods to challenge a signed acknowledgment of
paternity in D.C.: rescind the acknowledgment within sixty days of signing,
45. WILHELMINA J. ROLARK, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO
COUNCILMEMBERS ON BILL 9-2, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PATERNITY ESTAB-
LISHMENT ACT 3 (1991).
46. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b)(1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
47. ROLARK, supra note 45.
48. Id. at 2.
49. See id. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id.
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challenge the validity of the acknowledgment’s execution, or challenge the
acknowledgment “on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact.”53 Where a man seeks to invalidate an acknowledgment based on non-
paternity, he will face obstacles no matter which method he chooses.
A. Rescission of the Acknowledgment
Pursuant to PRWORA,54 the D.C. Code provides that a signatory to
an acknowledgment may rescind the acknowledgment “within the earlier of
60 days or the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding relating to
the child in which the signatory is a party.”55 This rescission period offers
signatories the chance to undo an acknowledgment with relative ease, in
contrast to the procedures for a post-rescission challenge.56 Rescission has its
origins in contract law; it annuls the contract from the beginning.57 A party
to a contract can rescind within a reasonable time after discovering facts
justifying rescission.58
Consequently, rescission seems to be an ill-fitting form of relief for
parties to an acknowledgment. In stark contrast to a contract for goods or
services, a paternity acknowledgment creates not only parental obligations
but also parental rights—rights that are considered among our society’s
53. District of Columbia ex rel. D.H. v. D.H., 140 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2117, 2119
(D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2012).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(5)(D)(ii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L. 113–54
and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
55. D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(a) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013); see also Child Sup-
port and Welfare Reform Compliance Amendment Act of 2000, 48 D.C. Reg. 1270
(Apr. 20, 2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections in titles 16 and 46 of the
D.C. Code) (permitting rescission of voluntary acknowledgments of paternity). Al-
though PRWORA mandates a 60-day rescission period, Mississippi law extends that
time period. The relevant Mississippi statute provides that a paternity acknowledg-
ment is subject to the right of any signatory to rescind within the earlier of “[o]ne (1)
year; or [t]he date of a judicial proceeding relating to the child, including a proceed-
ing to establish a support order, in which the signatory is a party.” MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-9-9(4)(a) (Westlaw through End of 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st & 2d Ex.
Sess.).
56. See infra Part II.C; see also D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw).
57. Friedman v. Kennedy, 40 A.2d 72, 74 (D.C. 1944) (quoting 1 HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 1 (1916) (“To rescind a contract is not merely to termi-
nate it but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning; that is, not merely to release
the parties from further obligation to each other in respect to the subject of the
contract, but to annul the contract and restore the parties to the relative positions
which they would have occupied if no such contract had ever been made.”)).
58. See, e.g., Cummings v. Jack Hurwitz, Inc., 204 A.2d 332, 333 (D.C. 1964).
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most sacred.59 Neither D.C. statutes nor case law offers much guidance as to
what grounds justify rescission of a paternity acknowledgment, or whether a
signatory must plead justification for rescission in the first place. For in-
stance, can a signatory seek rescission simply because he changed his mind
about signing the acknowledgment? The answer is unclear. The steps to
rescind—where and how to make a request for rescission—are similarly un-
clear. If there is an upcoming administrative or judicial proceeding relating
to the minor child such as a support hearing on the court’s calendar, could a
signatory make an oral motion to rescind at the hearing? If there is no
upcoming administrative or judicial proceeding scheduled at which the sig-
natory could raise the issue, must the signatory initiate the rescission process
by filing a complaint within sixty days of signing the acknowledgment?
Would a signatory in such a case be required to serve the D.C. government
and the other signatory with notice of the complaint to rescind? The stat-
ute’s silence on the particulars of rescission likely contributes to litigants’
procedural woes, particularly those without legal representation.60
Other states fare better in clarifying the proper use of the rescission
option. Some jurisdictions require an allegation or proof that the putative
father is not the biological father.61 Certain jurisdictions, such as West Vir-
ginia and Louisiana, make clear that a court can void the acknowledgment
without evidence of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact when a signa-
tory seeks such relief within sixty days of execution of the acknowledg-
ment.62 Some states elaborate on the process of requesting a rescission:
59. Although “domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law,” Mansell v.
Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989), on the few occasions where the Supreme Court
has taken up the issue of parenthood, it has consistently recognized the “fundamen-
tal liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their
child.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Described as “[p]erhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” recognized by the Supreme Court, par-
ents’ decision-making power concerning their children’s welfare is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65–66 (2000).
60. For example, a report by the District of Columbia Access to Justice Commission
stated that in 2005, 98% of respondents in child support and paternity matters
before D.C. Superior Court were unrepresented. D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY 7, 63 (2008).
61. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.3A(12)(a) (Westlaw through legis. from the
2013 Reg. Sess.) (requiring signatory to attest that putative father is not the biologi-
cal father on rescission form); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C § 11(a) (Westlaw
through Ch. 195 of the 1st Ann. Sess. 2013) ( requiring court to order genetic
testing and proceed to adjudicate paternity or non-paternity if either party rescinds
in a timely fashion).
62. See e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-10(h)(5)(D) (Westlaw through the 2013 1st
Extraordinary Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:406(A) (Westlaw through the 2013
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California requires that the appropriate state agency develop a form for re-
scission of the acknowledgment with instructions on how to complete the
form and file for rescission.63
Perhaps the biggest drawback to the rescission process in D.C. is that,
although the rights and obligations that flow from the acknowledgment are
significant, the time to rescind—sixty days or less—is very brief. In order to
effectuate rescission in D.C., one or both of the acknowledgment’s signato-
ries must have doubts about the document’s veracity immediately after sign-
ing it. Once the allotted time has run, the conclusive presumption of
paternity will be triggered and the male signatory is presumed to be the
child’s legal father.
The truth of the child’s paternity may not be discovered in that initial
sixty days. Where there is no reason for a signatory to question the truthful-
ness of the acknowledgment’s statements—if, for instance, he has no reason
to question the mother’s representations that he is the father of the child—
then it is likely that the sixty-day rescission period will pass with no action
by either signatory. For example, in G. v. H.,64 the putative father had no
Reg. Sess.). In West Virginia, a signatory may rescind by filing a complaint within
sixty days of execution and by including in the complaint the name of the child, the
name of the other parent, the date of the birth of the child, the date of signing the
acknowledgment, and “a statement that he or she wishes to rescind the acknowledg-
ment of the paternity.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-10(h)(5)(A) (Westlaw). The law
goes on to provide, “If the complaint was filed within sixty days of the date the
affidavit of paternity was executed, the court shall order the acknowledgment to be
rescinded without any requirement of a showing of fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact.” § 16-5-10(h)(5)(D) (Westlaw). If such a complaint is filed more than sixty
days from the date of execution of the affidavit of paternity or the date of an admin-
istrative or judicial proceeding relating to the child in which the signatory of the
affidavit of paternity is a party, then the complaint must include “specific allegations
concerning the elements of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.” § 16-5-
10(h)(5)(A) (Westlaw).
Louisiana law provides that an acknowledgment may be revoked “without cause”
within sixty days of its execution during a judicial hearing. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:406(A)(1)(b) (Westlaw). After the initial sixty days has passed, a signatory may
petition a court for revocation of the acknowledgment upon proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the acknowledgment “was induced by fraud, duress, material
mistake of fact or error, or that the person is not the biological parent of the child.”
§ 9:406(B)(1) (Westlaw). Louisiana law also mandates that the appropriate state
agency develop a form and process for the revocation of an acknowledgment.
§ 9:406(A)(1)(a) (Westlaw).
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575(a) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. laws, all 2013–14 1st
Ex. Sess. laws, and Res. c. 123 (S.C.A.3)); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:27
(Westlaw through Ch. 279 (End) of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (detailing what informa-
tion must be included in a request for rescission of paternity acknowledgment).
64. There are few published decisions addressing the validity of paternity acknowledg-
ments in D.C., and therefore, in some instances this Article refers to unpublished
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reason to question paternity either before or after he signed the acknowledg-
ment until the child’s mother disclosed to him, several months after he
signed the acknowledgment, that their relationship had been non-
exclusive.65
A child support prosecution of the putative father by the D.C. govern-
ment may be filed months, and sometimes years, after the initial sixty-day
period has passed.66 The government may initiate a proceeding to determine
parentage and obtain a support order anytime until the child’s twenty-first
birthday.67 For example, the government might not become involved in a
support case until the custodial parent begins receiving public benefits on
behalf of the child, which could occur months or years after the child’s birth
and, consequently, months or years after the acknowledgment was executed.
Nevertheless, the timing of the government’s suit against the putative
father could impact whether he utilizes the rescission process. If there are no
immediate consequences for the putative father following the signing of an
acknowledgment, it is unlikely that he will take advantage of the rescission
period because he has no reason to scrutinize the accuracy of the representa-
tions regarding his paternity. Legal action serves to put the signatory on
actual notice of the acknowledgment’s repercussions: an obligation to ap-
pear in court and a determination of how much, if any, child support he
owes to the custodial parent. That may be, in part, why the D.C. statute
shortens the rescission period where there is an administrative or judicial
proceeding related to the child and involving the signatory.68
court orders. For unpublished court decisions, citations will refer to the parties by
the first initial of their last name only in order to protect their privacy.
65. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010); see
also Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *23–24
(D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008) (“[I]t may only be [the child’s mother],
but is certainly not [the putative father], who was in possession of full information as
to the potential parentage of this child. She, and not the Respondent, had access to
the most pertinent details underlying the adjudication of paternity in this case.”).
66. See, e.g., District of Columbia ex rel. D.H. v. D.H., 140 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2117,
2117 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2012) (noting that acknowledgment was signed in
July 2008, while the government petition for support was filed in January 2009);
District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933, 934
(D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (noting that acknowledgment was purportedly
signed in February 2008, while the government petition was filed in November
2008); G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 10 (noting that acknowledgment
was signed in March 2006 while the government petition was filed in December
2006); Robertson v. Anderson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2357, 2359 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Oct. 7, 2008) (noting that acknowledgment was signed in July 2005, while the
government petition was filed in February 2006).
67. D.C. CODE § 16-2342(b) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
68. § 16-909.01(a-1) (Westlaw) (“A signatory to a voluntary acknowledgment of pater-
nity pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of this section may rescind the acknowledgment
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A litigant’s failure to affirmatively seek rescission or challenge an ac-
knowledgment prior to the government’s litigation could be an absolute bar
to obtaining a court order for genetic testing to determine the biological
connections of the signatories and the child. Where there is no successful
rescission of an acknowledgment, a D.C. court is not obligated to order
genetic testing in a paternity case.69
In fact, it would be reasonable to interpret the relevant statute, D.C.
Code Section 16-2343(a)(3), as barring testing altogether.70 In F. v. F,71 an
associate judge vacated a magistrate judge’s order for paternity testing. The
putative father in F. v. F. had signed an acknowledgment of paternity soon
after the child’s birth. Nearly six years after the child’s birth, the D.C. gov-
ernment filed a petition for child support on behalf of the minor child. At a
hearing on the petition, the magistrate judge ordered a paternity test; the
test excluded the signatory as the biological father of the child and the judge
subsequently dismissed the support case.72 On the government’s motion for
review, however, the associate judge noted that the putative father had never
attempted to rescind the acknowledgment in the intervening six years.73
Absent such an attempt to rescind, the F. v. F. court concluded, “a subse-
quent paternity test is legally irrelevant and inappropriate.”74 More recently,
in D.H. v. D.H., a judge concluded that if a validly executed acknowledg-
ment exists, pursuant to Section 16-2343(a)(3) of the D.C. Code, “a court
may not order genetic testing.”75 The F. v. F. and D.H. v. D.H. cases illus-
trate the significant impact that the federally mandated sixty-day rescission
period can have: where the parties take no action to rescind, a court can
within the earlier of 60 days or the date of an administrative or judicial proceeding
relating to the child in which the signatory is a party.”).
69. § 16-2343(a)(3) (Westlaw).
70. D.C. Code Section 16-2343(a) provides in relevant part:
[T]he court, on its own motion, may require, or, on the motion of a party,
shall require, the child and all other parties to submit to medical or genetic
tests, unless . . . [t]he parties have signed a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity pursuant to section 16-909.01(a) . . . and have not made a legally-
effective rescission of the acknowledgment.
§ 16-2343(a) (Westlaw).
71. District of Columbia ex rel. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2008).
72. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 2.
73. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 3–4.
74. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 4.
75. District of Columbia ex rel. D.H. v. D.H., 140 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2117, 2119
(D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2012).
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interpret this as a failure to preserve their rights, which in turn justifies a bar
on any future challenges to the acknowledgment.76
B. The Conclusive Presumption of Paternity
D.C. law provides that a “conclusive presumption” of paternity is cre-
ated either by a genetic test result or by the father’s acknowledgement of
paternity in writing.77 The D.C. Council contemplated—and ultimately
approved—the creation of that conclusive presumption during legislative
hearings for the D.C. Paternity Establishment Act of 1994.78 The legal
counsel for the District—then known as the Office of Corporation Coun-
sel—and a representative from the District’s Office of Paternity and Child
Support Enforcement participated in those legislative hearings and both
strongly endorsed the proposed amendment.79 In a letter to the D.C. Coun-
cil’s Committee on the Judiciary, the Office of Corporation Counsel ex-
pressed its support for the conclusive presumption for both the genetic test
and the written acknowledgment, stating, “the interests of the child in re-
ceiving support and achieving finality in the determination of basic family
relationships outweigh the minimal possibility of an erroneous result.”80
This is a curious description to apply to both a genetic test and to an
acknowledgment, since only the former can yield a “99% or greater
probability of paternity” based on scientific fact.81 The acknowledgment, of
course, is not based on any test but on the representations and beliefs of the
two parties signing the document.82 Notwithstanding this crucial distinc-
tion, in its letter to the D.C. Council, the Office of Corporation Counsel
76. See also M.M. v. T-M.M., 995 A.2d 164, 166 (D.C. 2010) (denying subsequent
challenge to paternity where litigant “created his own obstacle to equitable relief
when he delayed any attempt to overturn the paternity and support order for twelve
years”).
77. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b-1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
78. D.C. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO COUNCILMEMBERS ON D.C. BILL 10-
777, “PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT ACT OF 1994” 2 (D.C. Oct. 12, 1994).
79. Letter from Laurie A. Ensworth, Asst. Chief, Child Support Section of Office of
Corp. Counsel, to Hon. James Nathanson, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 1–2
(D.C. Oct. 11, 1994).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2. Courts in D.C. have long stated that the results of genetic tests or blood
tests can be conclusive proof of non-paternity. See S.A. v. M.A, 531 A.2d 1246,
1250 (D.C. 1987); Retzer v. Retzer, 161 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1960). The D.C.
Code provides that the results of genetic testing, if they meet certain scientific stan-
dards, “shall be conclusive evidence of nonpaternity, unless contrary test results are
received.” D.C. CODE § 16-2343.01(c)(3) (Westlaw).
82. As discussed below, reliance on the beliefs and representations of the other parent has
led to situations where a man discovers he is not the biological father after he has
signed the acknowledgment of paternity. See infra Part II.C.
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stated that a conclusive presumption “is even more suitable in the case of a
voluntary acknowledgment executed by the putative father under oath.”83
According to the Office of Corporation Counsel, the voluntary acknowledg-
ment “allows a putative father to consider the implications of his acknowl-
edgment and to investigate any questionable circumstances surrounding the
child’s conception before assuming the responsibilities of parenthood.”84 In
contrast to the “reluctant father” who is forced to undergo genetic testing by
court order, the Office of Corporation Counsel described the would-be sig-
natory as executing the acknowledgment “at his leisure” and “on his own
initiative,” thereby making it “entirely reasonable” to give “binding legal
effect” to his actions.85
Policymakers attributed a significant amount of agency and opportu-
nity to the would-be signatory. Elsewhere in the legislative history to the
1994 amendments, the representative for the Office of Corporation Coun-
sel stated that a conclusive presumption should be used as a matter of public
policy because, among other reasons, it “places a burden on the putative
father to obtain a genetic test prior to signing a voluntary acknowledg-
ment.”86 However, at that time there was no language in the existing statute
or the proposed legislation requiring that the putative father be advised of
his right to genetic testing. Even today there is no statutory requirement
that the parties to an acknowledgment be advised about genetic testing.
The Office of Corporation Counsel noted that in most adjudications
of paternity in D.C. Superior Court, voluntary written acknowledgments
are executed in open court, and it reasoned that creating a conclusive pre-
sumption for all written voluntary acknowledgments “simply extends the
same measure of legal protection to children whose fathers acknowledge
paternity without being sued for support.”87 Other jurisdictions have simi-
larly concluded that the significance of the act of voluntarily signing such an
acknowledgment justifies the conclusive presumption.88
83. Ensworth, supra note 79, at 2 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. JAMES E. NATHANSON, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO COUNCILMEMBERS
ON D.C. BILL 10-777, “PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT ACT OF 1994” 2 (1994).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., In re Paternity of an Unknown Minor, 951 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2011) (quoting People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d
1204, 1214 (Ill. 2004)) (noting the disparate treatment of men presumed to be
fathers by the marital presumption and by a signed acknowledgment by commenting
that “it would be unreasonable to allow a man . . . to undo his voluntary acknowl-
edgment years later on the basis of DNA test results, when his paternity was based
not on a mere marital presumption that he was the child’s father but on his con-
scious decision to accept the legal responsibility of being the child’s father.”); Cesar
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This logic overlooks the vast difference between adjudication, with
due process protections administered by an impartial judge, and an ac-
knowledgment, which is usually presented and executed in a hospital room
or government agency office with no judicial officer or even a notary pre-
sent.89 The latter is simply not a comparable setting to adjudication for
thoughtful deliberation.90 Either the Office of Corporation Counsel as-
sumed that a signatory to the acknowledgment would be fully informed
about the child’s parentage prior to signing the acknowledgment or, more
troubling, did not find cause for alarm if the signatory was uninformed
about those facts and signed the document anyway. Later legislation affirm-
atively foreclosed the possibility of additional procedural protections for sig-
natories by explicitly disallowing judicial or administrative proceedings to
ratify a voluntary acknowledgment.91
Applying a conclusive presumption to an acknowledgment has serious
evidentiary implications. Though not defined in the D.C. or federal statutes
regarding paternity establishment, a conclusive presumption is not an unfa-
miliar term in our jurisprudence. As the language in OBRA implies,92 it is
an alternative to a rebuttable presumption. A fact-finder may conclude that
a presumptively rebuttable fact is incorrect or untrue based on other factual
evidence. By contrast, conclusive presumptions—sometimes referred to by
the more apt term “irrebutable presumptions”—are described as “fictions in
which a rule of substantive law comes disguised as a presumption.”93 Con-
C. v. Alicia L., 800 N.W.2d 249, 257 (Neb. 2011); Burden v. Burden, 945 A.2d
656, 669 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
89. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services require
the presence of a witness or a notary to authenticate the parents’ signatures on the
voluntary acknowledgment. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(4) (Westlaw through Jan. 30,
2014; 79 FR 5222). In one of several ambiguities plaguing the D.C. statutes, the
description of a voluntary acknowledgment states that the written oath of the parents
“may include [a] signature in the presence of a notary.” D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(a)
(Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013) (emphasis added). However, elsewhere the D.C.
Code requires birthing hospitals and the Vital Records Registrar to provide written
notice to unmarried individuals that a voluntary acknowledgment “is not effectuated
unless the mother and putative father each signs the form under oath and a notary
authenticates the signatures.” §§ 16-909.03(b)(1)(D), 16-909.04(a)(4) (Westlaw).
90. See infra Part II.C.
91. § 16-2342.01(b) (Westlaw). Federal law mandated this provision. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 666(a)(5)(C)(iii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L. 113–54 and
113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
92. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13721(b)(2)(C), 107 Stat. 312, 659 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666).
93. 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5124, at 494-95 (2d ed., 2005);
see also 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2492,
at 307–08 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1981) (citing State v. Platt, 2 S.C. 150, 154
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tradictory facts cannot challenge a conclusive presumption; in effect, the
presumption short-circuits the fact-finding responsibilities of the court.94
The conclusive presumption of paternity in D.C. that flows from a
voluntary acknowledgment establishes that the signatories are the legal par-
ents of the child; no additional testimony or evidence is required. Once the
signatories are found to be the child’s legal parents, all rights and responsi-
bilities of parenthood, including the obligation to support the child, are
invoked. The D.C. statute provides that where there is no presumed parent
and where there has been no rescission, the acknowledgment “shall legally
establish the parent-child relationship between the father and the child for
all rights, privileges, duties, and obligations under the laws of the District of
Columbia.”95
The legislative history accompanying these amendments to D.C.’s pa-
ternity statutes underscores the importance of federal funding to localities.
The Paternity Establishment Act of 1994, enacted in response to OBRA,96
was passed in part due to the D.C. Council’s concern that the District could
lose as much as $13 million in federal funding for its IV-D program if it did
not comply with federal law.97 While OBRA gave states the option of at-
taching either a rebuttable or conclusive presumption of paternity to written
acknowledgments of paternity, the D.C. Council opted to apply a conclu-
sive presumption.98 Even though PRWORA subsequently omitted mention
of the option for a rebuttable or a conclusive presumption of paternity and
federal law is currently silent on the issue, D.C. continues to attach a con-
clusive presumption to paternity acknowledgments.99
Other states have also promulgated paternity laws that attach a con-
clusive presumption to acknowledgments. In Rhode Island, “[t]he sworn
acknowledgment of paternity becomes a conclusive presumption if there is
(1879)) (“In strictness there cannot be such a thing as a ‘conclusive presumption.’
Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense the
opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact
does not exist, the rule is really providing that where the first fact is shown to exist,
the second fact’s existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent’s
case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law and not a rule appor-
tioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the duty of
coming forward with evidence.”).
94. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999) (addressing conclusive presump-
tions in the context of criminal jury trials).
95. D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(b) (Westlaw).
96. JAMES E. NATHANSON, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO COUNCILMEMBERS
ON D.C. BILL 10-777, “PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT ACT OF 1994” 2 (1994).
97. Id.
98. See Paternity Establishment Act of 1994, 41 D.C. Reg. 8051 (Mar. 16, 1995) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections in title 16 of the D.C. Code).
99. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b-1)(2) (Westlaw).
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no court challenge to this acknowledgment within sixty (60) days of the
signing of this acknowledgment.” Rhode Island’s paternity statute further
provides that “[t]he only defenses which may be raised to the signing of this
acknowledgment after the sixty (60) day period are fraud, duress or mistake
of fact.”100 Some states, such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin,
make clear that an unrescinded written acknowledgment has the same con-
clusive effect as a judgment.101 Even a rebuttable presumption of parentage
can become conclusive if there is no challenge to the presumption within
the time provided in a state’s statute. In D.C., for instance, a rebuttable
presumption of paternity arises when the parents are married at the time of
the child’s birth. A challenge to that presumption must be brought within
two years of the child’s birth after which the presumption becomes
conclusive.102
The Office of Corporation Counsel stated in no uncertain terms that
the legislative body should not consider enacting a law with a rebuttable
presumption for either the DNA test or the voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. Although the Counsel acknowledged that a rebuttable presump-
tion “would provide a putative father with an opportunity to challenge a
paternity finding he believed to be erroneous,” it argued that the rebuttable
presumption would also provide putative fathers seeking to avoid support
obligations with further opportunities to prolong litigation and to challenge
existing support orders.”103 The Counsel referred to the purported ease with
which fathers challenged written paternity acknowledgments where a rebut-
table presumption applied, stating that in its experience, the rebuttable pre-
sumption of paternity “is so easily rebuttable as to have little legal effect.”104
In such cases, according to the Counsel, courts responded to paternity chal-
lenges by ordering genetic tests, which often caused “significant disruption
to the child’s emotional life and ability to obtain support.”105
While the impact of later genetic testing on a child’s life and the sta-
bility of the family is of serious import in any paternity case, it is a mistake
100. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-3(a)(5) (Westlaw through ch. 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
101. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103(d) (Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 2013-88,
91, 93–97, 99–103, except 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7101 to end 2013–14); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(B)(2) (Westlaw through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the
End of the 2013 Spec. Sess. I.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.805 (Westlaw through 2013
Wis. Act 116, published Dec. 21, 2013).
102. D.C. CODE § 16-2342(c) (Westlaw). In Minnesota, by contrast, a presumption of
paternity becomes conclusive if no challenge is brought within three years of a decla-
ration of paternity. See DeGrande v. Demby, 529 N.W.2d 340 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 257.57).
103. Ensworth, supra note 79, at 2–3.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id.
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to assume that a conclusive presumption is the best approach to support the
health and stability of a family unit. As I discuss in Part III, a paternity
acknowledgment and a desire for genetic testing need not be at odds with
one another. Instead, the existence of an acknowledgment should not make
irrelevant or immaterial evidence of a lack of biological connection between
the putative father and the child.
C. Post-Rescission Challenges
Can a signatory overcome the conclusiveness of a conclusive presump-
tion? If a signatory does not request rescission within sixty days of signing, it
will be exceedingly difficult for him to succeed in having his challenge
heard, let alone decided in his favor. If an acknowledgment is not rescinded,
it constitutes a legal finding of the parent-child relationship and creates the
aforementioned conclusive presumption of paternity.106 At that point, it is
difficult for a signatory to challenge the finding of parenthood based on a
paternity acknowledgment:
A conclusive presumption thus established may be challenged in
the Superior Court after the rescission period . . . through the
same procedures as are applicable to a final judgment of the Su-
perior Court, but only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenging
party.107
Although PRWORA requires jurisdictions to establish procedures
under which a written acknowledgment of paternity can be challenged on
the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,108 it makes no men-
tion of time limitations on such challenges. Neither does PRWORA require
incorporation of a final judgment rule, which seeks to preserve the finality
of a judgment deliberately rendered through adjudication.109 The final judg-
ment rule circumscribes post-judgment challenges such that a litigant may
106. D.C. CODE §§ 16-909.01(b), 16-2342.01(a)(1) (Westlaw).
107. Matthews v. District of Columbia, 875 A.2d 650, 656 (D.C. 2005) (citing D.C.
CODE § 16-909(c-1)).
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113-65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
109. See generally Johnson v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 723 A.2d 852, 856 (D.C. 1999)
(“A final judgment is defined as a prior adjudication of an issue in another action
that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.”) (internal
quotations omitted). See also Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d
515, 520 (D.C. 1985) (noting that post judgment relief is only permissible under
exceptional circumstances).
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argue only a narrowly tailored set of claims for relief.110 In doing so, the rule
balances a litigant’s interest in fairness and justice against the need for pre-
dictability and enforceability of a court’s ruling.111
Despite the lack of a federal requirement for inclusion of the final
judgment rule, the D.C. Council chose, as other jurisdictions have, to in-
corporate the local judicial rule on final judgment.112 Reference to the final
judgment rule, however, has only compounded the confusion regarding
challenges to paternity acknowledgments.
The final judgment rule in D.C.’s Domestic Relations Procedural
Rules is Rule 60(b), the same final judgment rule in D.C. Superior Court’s
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Domestic
Relations Rule 60(b), entitled “Relief from Judgment or Order,” allows for
post-judgment challenges on the following grounds:
• mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
• newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
SCR-Dom. Rel. 59(b);
• fraud (whether previously denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
• the judgment is void;
• the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or
• any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.113
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments explains the rationale of the
final judgment rule:
110. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 60(b) (Westlaw through June 15, 2013).
111. See, e.g., 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 2851, at 286 (3d ed., 2012) (citing Hutchins v. Zoll Medical Corp., 492 F.3d
1377, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (noting that Rule 60 “attempts to strike a proper
balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end
and that justice should be done”).
112. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (Westlaw through June 15, 2013); D.C.
SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 60(b) (Westlaw).
113. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 60(b) (Westlaw).
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This Section makes the general common-sense point that such
conclusive carry-over effect should not be accorded a judgment
which is considered merely tentative in the very action in which
it was rendered. On the contrary, the judgment must ordinarily
be a firm and stable one, the “last word” of the rendering
court—a “final” judgment.114
1. Time Limitations
D.C.’s procedural rule on final judgments includes a time limitation.
For most post-judgment challenges the motion for relief must be brought
“within a reasonable time,” but for a motion based on “mistake” or “fraud,”
inter alia, the motion must be made “not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”115 The D.C. statute
on disestablishment of paternity does not explicitly reference Rule 60(b)’s
time restrictions on post-judgment challenges; instead, it provides that post-
rescission challenges must be made “through the same procedures as are
applicable to a final judgment of the Superior Court.”116 Notwithstanding
the fact that there is no explicit time restriction in the relevant D.C. pater-
nity statute, the government has contended that a signatory is foreclosed
from challenging an acknowledgement’s validity because he did so more
than one year from the date he signed the document.117
The D.C. Court of Appeals has not explicitly ruled on the application
of Rule 60(b)’s time limitations to post-rescission challenges to paternity
acknowledgments, however, it has suggested that such challenges may be
brought after one year in some circumstances. In Matthews v. District of
Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals considered the substance of a post-
rescission challenge to paternity that occurred at least two years after the
signing of an acknowledgment, thereby allowing a post-rescission challenge
to be brought outside the one-year limitation purportedly proscribed by
Rule 60(b).118 Although lower courts have interpreted the decision as al-
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. a (1982).
115. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 60(b) (Westlaw).
116. D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
117. See Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *6 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008) (“The government’s position is that Rule 60(b)
motions premised on such grounds must be made within one year from the date of
the judgment, and that the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to
avoid that time limitation.”); Robertson v. Anderson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP.
2358, 2359 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2008) (“When the rescission period has passed,
the government asserts that Rule 60(b)(3) of the Rules Governing Domestic Rela-
tions Proceedings applies and any challenges to an acknowledgment of paternity
must be made within a year after the acknowledgment become[s] final.”).
118. Matthews v. District of Columbia, 875 A.2d 650, 654 (D.C. 2005).
2014] F I G H T I N G  T H E  E S T A B L I S H M E N T 93
lowing for liberal construction of the time limitation,119 the Matthews court
did not address the timing issue directly.120
More recently, in M.M. v. T-M.M., the D.C. Court of Appeals indi-
cated that a motion challenging paternity pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) must
be made “within a reasonable time” and that the challenge in the case at bar
was unreasonable when filed twelve years after the putative father had ac-
knowledged paternity.121 Although the challenger had subsequently ob-
tained genetic proof that he was not the biological father of the child, the
M.M. appellate court agreed with the lower court that the man “created his
own obstacle to equitable relief when he delayed any attempt to overturn
the paternity and support order for twelve years.”122 The M.M. court made
clear that there was a strict one-year time limitation for all other Rule 60(b)
requests for relief. It emphasized that the putative father’s genetic test results
could not provide the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) be-
cause such a claim would be barred by the one-year time limitation.123
There is one crucial distinction between the M.M. case and many
other paternity cases: in M.M., the putative father had acknowledged that
he was the father at a court hearing, and thus his paternity was established
by adjudication, not by written acknowledgment.124 Although the litigant
contended that he acknowledged paternity primarily because he believed the
mother’s statement that he was the father125—a justification that is not un-
common in such cases—the father in M.M. had at least some procedural
protections available to him that are lacking in the out-of-court settings in
which acknowledgments are signed. Thus, to the M.M. court, the chal-
lenger’s twelve-year delay may have seemed particularly unreasonable in
light of the fact that he had acknowledged paternity in open court.
Of course, adjudications of paternity do not always deliver appropriate
procedural protections. In Bradford v. Rice, the court outlined the failure of
the government to provide adequate notice to a pro se litigant in a paternity
119. See, e.g., Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360 (finding that the Matthews
court “indirectly rejects the idea that the Rule 60(b)(3) one year time limit for chal-
lenging final judgments necessarily applies to acknowledgments of paternity”).
120. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
121. M.M. v. T-M.M., 995 A.2d 164, 166 (D.C. 2010).
122. M.M., 995 A.2d at 167.
123. M.M., 995 A.2d at 166 n.1.
124. M.M., 995 A.2d at 165 (stating that the putative father “acknowledged that he was
[the child’s] father” at an April 1993 hearing on the petition to establish paternity
and child support). Note, though, that in M.M. the appellate court cites to the D.C.
Code section 16-909(c) language about challenging a written acknowledgment of
paternity despite the fact that it appears to have been an adjudication of paternity.
Id. at 166.
125. M.M., 995 A.2d at 165.
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adjudication.126 Professor Jane C. Murphy has noted that courts can and do
enter default judgments against putative fathers when no actual notice of
the proceedings has been provided.127 A party’s confusion about the impli-
cations of acknowledging or consenting to paternity can still occur in the
courtroom setting. As Professor Murphy points out, the absence of legal
representation for most putative fathers, the sheer volume of paternity cases,
and the “routine treatment” of such cases by the child support agency “leave
many fathers misinformed about the significance of the proceedings.”128
When courts have allowed challenges to acknowledgments to go for-
ward despite a delay in bringing the challenge, they have addressed the im-
pact of Rule 60(b). In Robertson v. Anderson, for example, after finding the
government’s timeliness argument to be “essentially moot” because the ac-
knowledgment was not properly executed,129 the court concluded that even
if the acknowledgment was properly executed, the government’s timeliness
argument was “flawed.”130 The court affirmatively stated that acknowledg-
ments are “not final judgments issued by a court of law,”131 thereby recog-
nizing the problem of relying on a final judgment rule in limiting a litigant’s
ability to challenge an acknowledgment’s validity. Consequently, stated the
court, the one year deadline “is not necessarily applicable” to post-rescission
challenges to acknowledgments.132 Courts in other cases have similarly dis-
regarded the one-year time limitation where they found that extraordinary
circumstances justified re-examining the acknowledgment under Rule
60(b)(6).133
These cases illustrate the problem with incorporating reference to the
final judgment rule into laws governing the paternity acknowledgments:
there is no actual final judgment of an acknowledgment of paternity. Ironi-
cally, the absence of a judgment in most paternity cases was exactly what
lawmakers had intended. As discussed in Part II, the federal legislation that
126. See Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *40 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008) (noting that litigant did not have attorney
present at adjudication).
127. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforce-
ment, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 357 (2005).
128. Id.
129. Robertson v. Anderson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2358, 2359–60 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 7, 2008).
130. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
131. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
132. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
133. See Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *25–26
(D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008); G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op.
at 12–13 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010).
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mandated the widespread use of paternity acknowledgments intended them
to be a substitute for a lengthy and expensive adjudicative process.
Until the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rules defini-
tively on the issue of the applicability of Rule 60(b)’s time limits, an unmar-
ried father’s post-rescission challenge may be attacked—and consequently
denied—on timeliness grounds, even where the government itself has
delayed initiating an action for child support.134 It is not unheard of for the
government to bring a paternity and support case after considerable time
has passed since the birth of the child or the signing of an acknowledgment.
In the Robertson case, the government initiated the paternity and support
action eight months after the acknowledgment was signed, and nearly thir-
teen years after the child was born.135 In G. v H., the petition for child
support was filed approximately nine months after the acknowledgment was
signed, and the putative father was served approximately seventeen months
after the acknowledgment was signed.136 Surely one must question the fair-
ness of a judicial system that appears to give the government carte blanche to
seek support whenever it deems it appropriate to do so but penalizes an
individual for not seeking relief in a timely manner when he has no reason
to believe he must seek such relief.
2. Voluntariness
The final judgment rule is appropriate in situations where a court has
rendered an actual judgment. A court’s ruling is the product of a judicial
process that requires ongoing protections for litigants’ due process rights
and obligates the judicial officer to deliberate prior to making a ruling.137
Importantly, these protections are absent from the process of signing an
acknowledgment of paternity. Although federal regulations promulgated by
the Department of Health and Human Services call for due process safe-
guards for voluntary acknowledgments,138 they provide no further guidance
as to what these safeguards should be. Any agent administering the ac-
knowledgment is required to provide the parents—prior to signing—with
both oral and written notice “of the alternatives to, legal consequences of,
and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the acknowledg-
134. District of Columbia ex rel. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2008).
135. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2359.
136. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 2–3.
137. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (due process clauses); see also D.C. SUPER. CT. R.
CIV. P. 52 (Westlaw through June 15, 2013) (requiring court to state all findings of
fact and conclusions of law); D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 52 (Westlaw through
June 15, 2013) (same).
138. 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(2)(iii) (Westlaw through Jan. 30, 2014; 79 FR 5222).
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ment.”139 But there is no requirement for deliberation—if anything, the
putative parents are encouraged to sign as soon as possible, often immedi-
ately following the birth of the child, so that the child’s birth certificate may
include the identity of both parents.140
The hospital setting is conducive to capturing men who might other-
wise disappear without determining their identities as fathers, but it is not
necessarily conducive to careful consideration and open communication
about the facts of paternity. There is no disinterested third-party official
present to ensure that the parties understand the legal implications of what
is happening. An agent of the District may be trained to present the requi-
site information to the parties, but there is no incentive for that agent to
provide sufficient notice; to the contrary, the District has an interest in
procuring as many signatures on acknowledgments as possible in order to be
eligible for future federal funds for social service programs.141 Indeed, the
hospital-based paternity establishment process has been cited as a “major
factor” for the high rates of voluntary paternity establishment across the
country.142
There are no apparent checks to ensure that proper notice and infor-
mation are given to the signatories. Moreover, neither federal nor D.C. law
requires that the signatories be advised about the availability of genetic test-
ing, although a court has noted that the hospital’s failure to inform the
father about the right to genetic testing “would surely undercut the validity”
of the acknowledgment.143 There is no statutory requirement to inform the
signatories about the processes for either rescinding or later challenging the
validity of the acknowledgment. No law requires that the government’s
agents at a hospital or in an agency explain to putative fathers the potential
for human error when signing the acknowledgment based on the representa-
tions of the child’s mother. Sometimes the mother does not “disclose critical
information regarding paternity”144 to the putative father when he signs the
acknowledgment.
139. D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(a) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
140. For instance, all hospitals, whether public or private, are required to offer an ac-
knowledgment and the opportunity to sign the acknowledgment to each unmarried
woman who gives birth at the hospital and the alleged putative father, if present in
the hospital, immediately before and after the birth of the child. See § 16-909.03(b)
(Westlaw).
141. See supra Part I.
142. Child Support Enforcement Program Hearing, supra note 32, at 9 (statement of Hon.
Olivia A. Golden, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs.).
143. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010).
144. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 11.
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The parents themselves may not be prepared to deliberate on the im-
plications of signing the acknowledgment while at the hospital.145 The mo-
ments immediately following the birth of a child can be emotionally
stressful146 and may be an inappropriate time to make important decisions.
The parents may not want to ask or answer sensitive questions about a
child’s paternity. Individuals may feel pressured to sign by extended family
members who are present at the birth. Indeed, the aforementioned 2000
Department of Health and Human Services report on the use of voluntary
acknowledgments evidenced concern among workers in the child support
system that, in the hospital setting where emotions run high and multiple
family members may be present, a signatory might feel coerced into signing
the acknowledgment and may not have the opportunity to ask or obtain
accurate information about his genetic ties to the newborn baby.147 In short,
one of the easiest procedures for identifying a child’s father is also easily
susceptible to manipulation and confusion.
In some of the cases where the putative father has initiated a post-
rescission challenge to paternity, the court did not analyze whether the pu-
tative father successfully proved one of the three exceptions to the final
judgment rule—fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.148 Instead, the
court scrutinized the circumstances under which the document was signed,
evaluating whether the voluntary acknowledgement was, in fact, signed vol-
untarily and voiding it where the evidence suggested otherwise.149 In Brad-
ford v. Rice, the putative father was served with a copy of the government’s
paternity and support petition the very morning that the initial hearing in
the matter was scheduled to take place, even though the notice itself stated
that it was to be served at least six days prior.150 Concerned with the “per-
145. NANCY DUFF CAMPBELL ET AL., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. & CTR. ON FATHERS,
FAMILIES, & PUB. POLICY, COMMON GROUND PROJECT, FAMILY TIES: IMPROVING
PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES FOR LOW-INCOME
MOTHERS, FATHERS AND CHILDREN 17 (2000) [hereinafter COMMON GROUND
PROJECT].
146. Id.
147. In the report, child support officials characterized the situation at hospitals as coer-
cive because, at the time of birth, “relatives of the newborn may make threats or
otherwise coerce one or both parties into signing an acknowledgment.” OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS,
supra note 38, at 11.
148. See infra Part III.A. (discussing the statutory exceptions to the conclusive presump-
tion of paternity).
149. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *1
(D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008); G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op.
at 4; District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933, 936
(D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012).
150. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *2.
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functory nature” of notice to the putative father—the man had not been
informed about the rights and responsibilities attendant to an acknowledg-
ment either—the Bradford court concluded that the putative father had not
made a “deliberate, voluntary and informed choice” regarding his acknowl-
edgment of paternity.151 More surprisingly, the putative father in that case
had the supposed benefit of an adjudication before a judicial officer.152
Similarly, in J.I.W. v. J.W., a D.C. court held that the conclusive pre-
sumption did not apply because the litigant was not provided with the re-
quired notice before signing the acknowledgment.153 The court found that
the signatory did not take any action even after he learned he might not be
the child’s biological father because “he was not aware he could do so and
was not aware of [the acknowledgment’s] legal significance.”154 In another
case where the court concluded there was insufficient deliberation at the
time of signing—and thus the acknowledgment was not knowingly
signed155—the court highlighted an important distinction between chal-
lenges to paternity and the typical post-judgment challenge: an imbalance of
knowable information between the two signatories, “[the mother] was in
possession of greater information on the issue of paternity than [the putative
father].”156 Similarly, the Bradford court recognized that in paternity cases,
the biological mother—and not the putative father—may be the only one
“in possession of full information as to the potential parentage of th[e]
child. . . . She, and not [the putative father], had access to the most perti-
nent details underlying the adjudication of paternity in this case.”157 The
putative father, consequently, might reasonably rely on the mother’s repre-
sentations as to who the father is.158
The analysis in Bradford underscores one of the drawbacks of govern-
ment officials and courts using an acknowledgment’s supposed voluntari-
151. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *44. The paternity
acknowledgment occurred prior to subsequent amendments to the D.C. laws which
codified such notice requirements; nevertheless the Bradford court concluded that
there was insufficient notice in that case. Id.
152. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *40.
153. J.I.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 936. The D.C. government has been admon-
ished for its lack of proper notice in other areas of paternity litigation. In District of
Columbia v. Burt, a judge upheld a magistrate judge’s determination that the govern-
ment’s paternity and support petitions had failed to comply with the pleading re-
quirements set forth in the court’s rules, noting that the government had deprived
some litigants of notice because of improper pleading. Burt, No. 2010-PCS-1823,
2011 D.C. Super. LEXIS 5, at *16 (D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011).
154. J.I.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 934.
155. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010).
156. G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 11.
157. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *23–24.
158. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *40.
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ness to justify its evidentiary weight as a conclusive presumption of
paternity. If a litigant is unable to demonstrate that an acknowledgment is
invalid because of a lack of voluntariness at the time of signing, his last
option for challenging paternity where he is not the biological father is to
demonstrate “fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,”159 the only post-
rescission grounds for such a challenge that are permitted by federal law.
III. WHY THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION MATTERS
The effect of signing an acknowledgment in D.C. is significant and
potentially long-lasting. A valid acknowledgment is a legal finding of a par-
ent-child relationship. That parent-child relationship includes “all rights,
privileges, duties, and obligations under the laws of the District of Colum-
bia.”160 Not only does a man deemed to be a child’s legal father have an
obligation to support that child until she is twenty-one,161 he also has a
constitutional right of access to the child through custody and visitation.162
A signatory who is not the biological father of a child but who is barred
from raising the issue of non-paternity before the court will not only have
an ongoing child support obligation for years to come, he will likely have a
right to care for and make decisions about the child’s upbringing.163
Consequently, the conclusive presumption of paternity is momentous
in the lives of not only the putative father but also the child and her mother.
It effectively creates a family unit in the eyes of the law. The presumption’s
impact on a putative father’s challenge to the accuracy and validity of an
acknowledgment is therefore worthy of further analysis.
A. Narrow Exceptions to the Presumption
The law permits but three avenues to refute the conclusive presump-
tion: fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.164 Although these relatively
narrow grounds are mandated by federal law and have been used to grant
relief from final judgments in civil litigation, in the context of paternity
acknowledgments, there is no further elaboration as to their definition in
159. D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
160. § 16-909.01(b) (Westlaw).
161. Butler v. Butler, 496 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985).
162. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978) (“We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitution-
ally protected.”).
163. § 16-914(a)(2) (Westlaw) (creating a rebuttable presumption of joint physical and
legal custody of a minor child).
164. § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw); see also Matthews v. District of Columbia, 875 A.2d 650,
656 (D.C. 2005) (interpreting section 16-909(c-1) to refute conclusive presumption
only on basis of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact).
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the federal statute. Both the federal and D.C. governments are aware of the
discrepancies in the law and the confusion over post-rescission challenges.
Over a decade ago, the Department of Health and Human Services recom-
mended that the federal government clarify the circumstances that consti-
tute fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact in the context of paternity
acknowledgments.165
Does fraud, for instance, include misrepresentations—intentional or
not—by the child’s mother regarding the child’s paternity?166 Do such mis-
representations constitute a material mistake of fact?167 Does the discovera-
bility of the fraud or mistake toll the statute of limitations? No such
clarifications have yet been issued, leaving litigants to wonder whether a
court will invalidate the acknowledgment in situations where the signatory
believed—incorrectly—that he was the biological father of the child.
Somewhat absurdly, the process for challenging an acknowledgment’s
validity is more difficult than a challenge to genetic test results. In D.C., a
man whose paternity is established conclusively by genetic testing may avail
himself of any of the bases in Rule 60(b) to challenge the test results.168 By
contrast, after the sixty-day rescission period ends, a man who voluntarily
acknowledged paternity may challenge the acknowledgment’s validity only
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.169
165. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGE-
MENTS, supra note 38, at 14.
166. Some states’ laws make explicit that the fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact
must exist at the time the acknowledgment is executed. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 516-a (McKinney 2009) (requiring that petitioner “prove[ ] to the court that the
acknowledgment of paternity was signed under fraud, duress, or due to a material
mistake of fact”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:406(C)(2) (Westlaw through the 2013
Reg. Sess.) ( “If the court finds based upon the evidence presented at the hearing that
there is substantial likelihood that fraud, duress, material mistake of fact or error
existed in the execution of the act or that the person who executed the authentic act
of acknowledgment is not the biological father, then, and only then, the court shall
order genetic tests . . . .”); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2.1 (Westlaw through 2013
1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Reg. Tech. Sess.) (requiring a court to determine that “fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit”
before granting a rescission after the initial sixty day period).
167. For example, Texas law provides that evidence, based on genetic testing, that the
man who is the signatory of an acknowledgment is not the child’s father constitutes
a material mistake of fact. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.308(d) (Westlaw through
end of the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the 83d Leg.).
168. Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *15 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008).
169. D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013); Bradford, No. 1991-
PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *15. Arguably, the Rule 60(b) grounds are
ill-fitted for challenging either a genetic test result or a paternity acknowledgment.
For instance, it stretches the imagination that a genetic test result could be contested
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This disparity in procedure is troublesome. If anything, a voluntary
acknowledgment—which is dependent upon the parties’ ability to commu-
nicate as well as the government’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligation to
sufficiently inform the parties of the consequences of signing—is more at
risk of being compromised by human error than a genetic test. One can
challenge a genetic test result using the “catch-all” provision of the final
judgment rule, Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a post-judgment challenge “for
any other reason justifying relief” from the judgment.170 Yet, per the lan-
guage of the relevant statute, one cannot challenge a paternity acknowledg-
ment under this “catch-all” provision; the law permits challenges to
acknowledgments “only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact.”171 By omitting any reference to Rule 60(b)(6)’s grounds for relief, the
paternity statute leaves open the possibility that legitimate but extraordinary
circumstances for seeking invalidation of the acknowledgment will not be
permitted.
A man can choose to submit to genetic testing instead of signing an
acknowledgment to establish his paternity. But if he chooses to sign an
acknowledgment—and forego testing at the outset—then he may be subse-
quently barred from submitting genetic test results as proof of non-pater-
nity, or even from successfully petitioning for such testing to be performed.
Because the acknowledgment is recognized as a “legal finding of pater-
nity,”172 which does not require any further proceeding to establish pater-
nity,173 the D.C. government can seek a court order for child support from
the signatory of the document on behalf of a child receiving TANF or
Medicaid. The D.C. Code states that a court “on its own motion, may
require, or, on the motion of a party, shall require, the child and all other
parties to submit to medical or genetic tests, unless . . . [t]he parties have
signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity . . . and have not made a
legally-effective rescission of the acknowledgment.”174 The government has
on the grounds that it is void per Rule 60(b)(4), or has somehow been satisfied,
released, or discharged per Rule 60(b)(5).
170. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. REL. R. 60(b)(6) (Westlaw through June 15, 2013). The
D.C. Court of Appeals has noted 60(b)(6) “allows relief only in unusual and ex-
traordinary situations justifying an exception to the overriding policy of finality, or
where the judgment may work an extreme or undue hardship.” Cox v. Cox, 707
A.2d 1297, 1299 (D.C. 1998) (citing Ohio Valley Constr. Co. v. Dew, 354 A.2d
518, 521 (D.C. 1976); Starling v. Jephunneh Lawrence & Assocs., 495 A.2d 1157,
1161 (D.C.1985)).
171. D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw).
172. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
173. D.C. CODE § 16-2342.01(a) (Westlaw).
174. § 16-2343(a)(3).
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argued that, where an acknowledgment has been executed, genetic testing
should not be performed, or if it has already been performed, should not be
admitted as evidence in a paternity case.175
In J.I.W. v. J.W., the D.C. government contended that genetic test
results that excluded the litigant as the father of the child did not overcome
the conclusive presumption created by the acknowledgment.176 Although
this argument was ultimately rejected by the court because the court found
that the signatory had not been provided the requisite notice prior to sign-
ing,177 other courts have reached the opposite result. In F. v. F., the court
stated that where the litigant failed to properly rescind the acknowledgment,
subsequent paternity testing was both “legally irrelevant” and
“inappropriate.”178
Exclusion of the results of a genetic test is unusual in the judicial sys-
tem. As the Bradford court noted:
Genetic tests are widely available and well-known to the general
public. . . . [W]ere the public to learn that the same court system
which makes DNA testing available as a matter of right in other
civil paternity cases and to criminal defendants charged with cer-
tain crimes because of its ability to exclude persons as the source
of biological material, ignored the results of such testing in a
paternity case, public confidence in the court system may well be
undermined to some extent.179
Given the additional expense of a genetic test, the disparity in the
presumptive weight of a test compared to that of an acknowledgment is
further skewed along socio-economic lines. Signing an acknowledgment
costs nothing for the signatories, but paternity established by acknowledg-
ment is not always biologically accurate. The accuracy of a genetic test is
175. See, e.g., G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20,
2010) (“The Government has taken the position that because Respondent signed an
Acknowledgment of Paternity at the hospital . . .  paternity has been established and
Respondent is now prohibited from seeking a review of the issue of paternity.”). In
Bradford, a magistrate judge went so far as to conclude that the putative father was
barred from being able to receive equitable relief from the court because he took the
child for a genetic test without the mother’s consent. Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-
2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *27 (D.C. Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14,
2008).
176. District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933, 935
n.14 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012).
177. J.I.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 935 n.14.
178. District of Columbia ex rel. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2008).
179. Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *47.
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virtually unassailable but it costs money to administer that test, anywhere
from one hundred to several hundred dollars.180 The men and women in-
volved in child support cases initiated by the government may not have the
means to pay for genetic testing at the time of the child’s birth and may
instead opt to sign an acknowledgment.181 Those who can afford to deter-
mine paternity by genetic testing not only have the advantage of knowing
with certainty the child’s paternity, but they can also avail themselves of
more ways to challenge, if necessary, those test results under any of the
provisions of the final judgment rule. Those who have signed a voluntary
acknowledgment instead and forego genetic testing will have both a greater
likelihood of an erroneous paternity and fewer ways to challenge its
establishment.
B. Realities of Child Support Obligations
While the government cannot force a parent to forge a relationship
with his or her child182 or guarantee that an individual will be a good par-
ent,183 it can require that the parent provide financial support for the
child.184 Assessing men’s non-financial contribution to the family unit is
both more complicated and less quantifiable than determining a monetary
figure for child support. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the financial responsibili-
ties of the father are often highlighted in our culture while his emotional
ties to his family have received much less attention by policymakers and
courts. Professor Nancy Dowd has stated that our society’s acknowledgment
of men’s ability to nurture and parent “has remained far secondary to defin-
180. Fairfax Identity Laboratories, one of the laboratories that handles genetic testing re-
quests for parties appearing before D.C. Superior Court, charges private individuals
(as opposed to government entities) $330 to administer a genetic test to a mother,
putative father, and child and submit those test results to the court. E-mail from
Lonna Durrence, Senior Marketing Associate, Fairfax Identity Labs, to Caroline
Rogus (Feb. 21, 2014, 09:48 A.M.) (on file with author). Even an unofficial, at-
home paternity test can cost $145. Absolute Match Online confidential paternity test-
ing, FAIRFAX IDENTITY LABS., available at http://www.fairfaxidlab.com/sites/fairfax/
files/files/Absolute-Match-Online-3-15-11-enabled.pdf.
181. See infra Part III.B.
182. See, e.g., W.F. v. K.J., 128 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1045, 1089 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec.
29, 1999) (“It is plain, of course, that a court cannot compel a man to love a child or
to maintain a paternal relationship with a child.”).
183. See Bradford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *29–30 (citing
Butler v. Butler, 496 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985)) (“An adjudication of paternity in
the District of Columbia confers a legal obligation to provide material support for
one’s child. It is silent on whether a person must also be a good parent to their
child.”).
184. See Butler, 496 A.2d at 622 (“Child support is a common law right which arises by
virtue of the existence of the family relationship.”).
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ing men’s role as purely economic, within the classic paradigm of the
breadwinner.”185
Not only is the relevance of a man’s non-financial support often ig-
nored in child support cases, but also the process to determine the amount
of financial support can put significant burdens on the obligor. Despite the
law’s intention to provide a speedy and efficient process by which to resolve
paternity issues, cases challenging paternity acknowledgments have lingered
in D.C. Superior Court for years.186 While his challenge to an acknowledg-
ment winds its way through the court system, the man’s support obligations
are not suspended unless “good cause” can be shown for doing so.187
Failing to adhere to a formal support order can have severe repercus-
sions, including the revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license, which can
make it almost impossible for the defendant to obtain or retain employ-
ment.188 An obligor could even face criminal sanctions for failure to pay.189
Some states, including D.C.,190 use contempt orders to ensure that support
orders are honored.191 These drastic measures for failure to pay are more
likely to become a reality given the high levels of unemployment for
185. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage, and Money to Nurture: Redefining Father-
hood, in GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY: THE IMPACT OF PATERNITY TESTING ON
PARENTS AND CHILDREN 81 (Mark A. Rothstein et al. eds., 2005). Interestingly,
some have suggested that women’s principal responsibility for children “is cotermi-
nous” with their own second-class status in the workplace. Darren Rosenbaum, Un-
sex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57,
66–67 (2012).
186. See, e.g., District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933,
933 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (entering an order on March 27, 2012 when
paternity was challenged on December 17, 2008); G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318,
slip op. at 2,15 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010) (entering order on December 20,
2010, when motion to vacate acknowledgment was filed January 23, 2008); Brad-
ford, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *4 (reversing, on May 14,
2008, a March 14, 2005 court order denying a motion to challenge paternity filed
August 20, 2003).
187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013); D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1)
(Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
188. Cancian et al., supra note 16, at 149.
189. All states have criminal sanctions that could be imposed if an obligor fails to pay
child support. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42389,
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: INCARCERATION AS THE LAST RESORT PENALTY
FOR NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT 17 (2012).
190. See D.C. CODE § 46-225.02(a) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013) (“The Mayor or a
party who has a legal claim to child support may initiate a criminal contempt action
for failure to pay the support by filing a motion in the civil action in which the
support order was established.”).
191. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2011).
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men,192especially in male-centric fields such as construction.193 A man may
feel trapped by the endless cycle of demands for which there is no resolu-
tion: he must get a job to fulfill his financial obligations, but there are no
jobs available.194 Feelings of frustration or resentment may be compounded
by the fact that the man is unable to be heard regarding his belief that he is
not the child’s father and that the acknowledgment is invalid. He may even
direct that frustration or resentment towards the child or the child’s mother
to whom he is now inextricably tied.195
192. As of October 2013, the national jobless rate for adult men was 7 percent; for
women it was 6.4 percent; for African-American adult men it was 13 percent. BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-13-2120, THE EMPLOY-
MENT SITUATION — OCTOBER 2013 at 13 tbl.A-2 (2013) [hereinafter THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION - OCTOBER 2013], available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/empsit_11082013.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE AF-
RICAN-AMERICAN LABOR FORCE IN THE RECOVERY 4–5 (2012), available at http://
www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/BlackLaborForce/BlackLaborForce.pdf (addressing
the connection between higher rates of unemployment for African-Americans and
lower educational attainment, as compared to whites).
193. See THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION - OCTOBER 2013, supra note 192, at 25 tbl.A-13
(examining employed and unemployed persons by occupation as of October 2013).
In the District, employment rates for manufacturing and construction jobs remain
low, especially when compared to employment rates for professional and business
services, education and health services, and government. Economy at a Glance: Dis-
trict of Columbia, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://stats.bls.gov/eag/eag.dc
.htm#eag_dc.f.P (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) (summarizing employment statistics
from May 2013 to October 2013). Although the employment rates in manufactur-
ing and construction are more stable in the greater D.C. metropolitan area—which
includes northern Virginia and Maryland—these vocations have not had the same
growth as seen in other fields. See Economy at a Glance: DC-VA-MD-WV, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.dc_washington_msa.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014); Economy at a Glance: Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-
VA-MD-WV (Metropolitan Division), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls
.gov/eag/eag.dc_washington_md.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) (noting change in
employment for last twelve months in various occupations).
194. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by Rethinking
Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
775, 775–76 (2012) (noting that although women have gained some ground in
having poverty laws respond to the particular issues facing unmarried, low-income
mothers, fathers have often been perceived “as an enemy to be pursued rather than a
fellow victim of poverty’s wrath, and potential partner towards the cure”).
195. See COMMON GROUND PROJECT, supra note 145, at 14 (“Because neither parent
can prevail against the power of government actions [i.e., paternity establishment,
TANF/Medicaid driven support actions], they vent their frustrations and feelings of
powerlessness against each other.”) Professors Carbone and Cahn have noted the
child support dispute process can cause both the putative father’s grievances against
the custodial parent and the child’s interest in the quality of the relationship between
the two to “disappear from view.” June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?
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Lastly, federal law does not permit any retroactive modification of a
child support order.196 Consequently, even if a man is successful in invali-
dating an acknowledgment based on non-paternity, if he has already paid
support on the child’s behalf—whether court-ordered or otherwise—he
may not be able to recover what he has already paid. Notwithstanding the
federal prohibition of retroactive modification of a support obligation, in
Maryland, the Court of Appeals held that where genetic testing excludes a
man as the biological father of a minor child, he cannot be legally obligated
to pay accrued arrears under a vacated paternity judgment.197 But the D.C.
Court of Appeals has not reached that same conclusion, instead ruling that
Rule 60(b), the rule on post-judgment relief, does not provide a basis for
ordering a refund for child support paid by a man who was subsequently
found to have no biological connection to the child. The court left open the
possibility that a litigant might use a “new and independent” lawsuit against
the D.C. government to recoup the child support he had already paid.198
C. Disparate Impact of Time Delay
As time passes, a signatory sees his chances for successfully challenging
an acknowledgment wither. Inevitably, events are forgotten, witnesses disap-
pear, and papers are lost in the interim period between the signing of the
acknowledgment and the prosecution for support. Even waiting for the offi-
cial genetic test results can cause delay. Although the testing is a relatively
simple procedure, it can take considerable time for the results to be made
available to the court and for the court to subsequently schedule the next
hearing to address the results. In the J.L.W. case, the test results were filed
nearly seven months after the court ordered the test be performed.199 The
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the signatory’s paternity in J.L.W. was
not held for another year and a half.200
Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1013 (2003).
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(9)(D)(ii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
197. Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609, 619 (Md. 2002) (holding that “the putative father
cannot be legally obligated for arrearages emanating from child support orders result-
ing from the now-vacated paternity declaration”).
198. V.P. v. L.S., 656 A.2d 1157, 1159 (D.C. 1995) (quoting United States v. One (1)
Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1377 (11th Cir. 1981)). It is not clear
whether the litigant was able to initiate a new action to recoup the approximately
$11,000 he had paid in child support, or if he was in fact reimbursed. Id.
199. District of Columbia ex. rel. J.I.W. v. J.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 933, 933
(D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012).
200. J.I.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 933.
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If there is no corroborating evidence or testimony, only the challenger
to the paternity acknowledgment is affected. Because an acknowledgment is
given a conclusive presumption of paternity, so long as the acknowledgment
exists then arguably the government has all the evidence it needs to success-
fully establish paternity and secure a permanent support order. Further-
more, if the government cannot prove that the signed document is a valid
acknowledgment, D.C. law offers the government a second bite at the pro-
verbial apple. If a signatory demonstrates that he was not provided the req-
uisite notice and information,201 and thus the conclusive presumption of
paternity does not apply in his case,202 the government may rely on another
section of the D.C. Code to argue that a rebuttable presumption of paternity
was created because, although not an official acknowledgment of paternity,
the signed acknowledgment constitutes a “writing acknowledging paternity”
pursuant to Section 16-909(a)(4) of the Code.203 The signatory will have to
try to overcome that presumption. In all likelihood his support obligations
will continue.204
D. Constitutional Implications
The conclusive presumption may run afoul of constitutional protec-
tions. In other statutory contexts, the procedural shortcomings of a conclu-
sive presumption have prompted constitutional challenges. Litigants have
argued that conclusive and irrebutable presumptions violate individuals’ due
process and equal protection rights.205 Courts have scrutinized the necessity
of a conclusive presumption. For instance, in deciding whether a conclusive
presumption passed constitutional muster, the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut questioned whether the presumption—that a family of a certain size
201. See D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(a) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
202. A magistrate judge concluded that an improperly signed acknowledgment—without
proper notice to the signatories—could not trigger the conclusive presumption of
paternity in section 16-2342.01(a)(1). See J.I.W., 141 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 936
n.14.
203. That provision reads in relevant part: “A father-child relationship is established
by . . . an unrebutted presumption under this subsection. There shall be a presump-
tion that a man is the father of a child . . . if the putative father has acknowledged
paternity in writing.” § 16-909.01(a)(4) (Westlaw).
204. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L.
113–54 and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013) (stating that support obligations
arising from challenged acknowledgment may not be suspended during the challenge
except for good cause shown); see also D.C. CODE § 16-909(c-1) (Westlaw) (stating
the same proposition).
205. See, e.g., Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Holmes, 872 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Ky. 1994);
Mullen v. Braatz, 508 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Klarfeld v. Dubose,
706 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Elliott v. Ehrlich, 280 N.W.2d 637,
640–41 (Neb. 1979).
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could live on a fixed living allowance without regard to a particular family’s
needs—was “necessarily or universally true in fact” and whether the state
“ha[d] reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determina-
tion.”206 The court found the presumption impermissible and a violation of
due process.207 Similarly, a Florida appeals court struck down a statute’s
provision that created a conclusive presumption because of “the high poten-
tial for inaccuracy of the conclusive presumption” and “the feasibility of
individualized determinations.”208
A conclusive presumption of paternity is not necessarily violative of
constitutional rights, especially if a court decides that the presumption does
not foreclose relief altogether. In Illinois, a statute provides that a presump-
tion of paternity arising from a voluntary acknowledgment becomes conclu-
sive if the acknowledgment is not rescinded,209 similar to the law in D.C. A
man who had signed an acknowledgment later discovered through DNA
testing that he was not the child’s biological father and subsequently filed a
complaint alleging the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship.210 Not-
ing that the language in the various state paternity statutes appeared to be in
conflict,211 the Illinois Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the law
did not permit a subsequent challenge to an acknowledgment based on ge-
netic test results.212 According to the court, it made “no sense . . . to allow
those men who sign voluntary acknowledgments to challenge the presump-
tion of their paternity with DNA evidence because the presumption with
respect to them is conclusive.”213 Although the Illinois Supreme Court did
not address the constitutionality of the statute’s conclusive presumption, it
did note that, although signatories could not challenge the conclusive pre-
206. Salemma v. White, 392 A.2d 969, 971 (Conn. 1978) (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 452 (1973)); see also Mullen, 508 N.W.2d at 448–49 (interpreting the
statutory language “service is complete upon mailing” to raise a rebuttable, and not a
conclusive presumption, since the latter violates the due process clause).
207. Salemma, 392 A.2d at 971.
208. Hall v. Recchi America Inc., 671 So. 2d 197, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In that
case, a workers’ compensation statute created an irrebutable presumption that a
workplace injury was caused by intoxication where the worker tested positive for
drugs. Id. at 200. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional in part, stat-
ing that “[a] positive confirmation of a drug at the time of the industrial injury does
not conclusively establish that the industrial accident was causally related to the in-
toxication of, or the influence of the drug upon, the employee.” Id. at 201–02.
209. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(b)(1), (b)(2) (Westlaw through P.A. 98–616 of the
2013 Reg. Sess.); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a) (Westlaw through P.A.
98–616 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.); see also People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Smith,
818 N.E.2d 1204, 1213 (Ill. 2004).
210. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1206–07.
211. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1210.
212. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1213.
213. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1213.
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sumption of paternity using contrary genetic test results, they were still able
to challenge the “voluntariness of the acknowledgment” on the grounds of
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.214
But are those grounds—fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact—
sufficient to protect the interests of the signatories? While the United States
Supreme Court has backed away from its earlier condemnation of conclu-
sive presumptions,215 the fact that such constitutional challenges continue to
be brought suggests that the propriety of conclusive presumptions in the
paternity context ought to be carefully scrutinized. A conclusive presump-
tion of paternity created by an acknowledgment could cut off a litigant’s
only avenue of relief from a burdensome and erroneous support obligation.
In Bradford, the D.C. court was “troubled by the absence of any alternative
means by which the Respondent might be able to obtain relief were he not
allowed to proceed” with his motion to invalidate the determination of
paternity.216
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: LET THERE BE PROCESS
A. Recognize the Importance of Fairness
Whether or not there are constitutional concerns about due process,
ensuring that the signatories to acknowledgments have a genuine opportu-
nity to be heard ought to be a higher priority for D.C. and other jurisdic-
tions. Professor Deborah Epstein has examined the role of procedural
fairness in predicting whether domestic violence offenders comply with
court orders.217 Her research indicates that “the likelihood of a person’s
compliance with . . . court orders issued in civil or criminal cases, is at least
214. Smith, 818 N.E.2d at 1213 (emphasis in original).
215. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120–21 (1989).
A conclusive presumption does, of course, foreclose the person against
whom it is invoked from demonstrating, in a particularized proceeding,
that applying the presumption to him will in fact not further the lawful
governmental policy the presumption is designed to effectuate. But the
same can be said of any legal rule that establishes general classifications,
whether framed in terms of a presumption or not.
Id. (upholding marital presumption of paternity).
216. Bradford v. Rice, No. 1991-PS-2474, 2008 D.C. Super. LEXIS 8, at *40 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Fam. Ct. May 14, 2008). The Bradford court analyzed an adjudication of
paternity, but the challenge to paternity, based on subsequent evidence of an absence
of a biological connection to the child, is similar to the analysis for a challenge to an
acknowledgment especially in light of the issues with notice and procedural fairness
that were at issue in that case. Id.
217. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering The State’s Response to Domestic Vio-
lence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1881–83 (2002).
110 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 21:67
as firmly rooted in his perception of fair process as in his satisfaction with
the ultimate result.”218 Epstein further notes: “Allowing a person to state
their views [before the court and] ensuring that their perspective is taken
seriously . . . enhances a person’s sense that authorities are moral and legiti-
mate.”219 A sense of fairness may even provide the individual with justifica-
tion for honoring the resulting court order.220
Procedural fairness in child support litigation has caught the United
States Supreme Court’s attention. In Turner v. Rogers, the Court addressed
whether an indigent, non-custodial parent has a constitutional right to
counsel in civil contempt proceedings for failure to pay child support.221
Ultimately the Court ruled that there was no such right, but its ruling was
based in large part on the fact that there were “alternative procedural safe-
guards” in place to protect the litigant’s rights.222 One of the procedural
safeguards identified by the Turner Court was a fair opportunity to present
and dispute relevant information which, not coincidentally, is also one of
the “building blocks of procedural justice” that Professor Epstein suggests
can contribute to a litigant’s sense of fairness.223 This safeguard is poten-
tially absent where a court decides that the conclusive presumption pre-
cludes any opportunity to present such information.
A genuine opportunity to be heard—so critical in domestic violence
cases224 and fundamental to the Supreme Court’s analysis of fairness in the
child support contempt context—is crucial to effectuating productive out-
comes in challenges to paternity acknowledgments as well. If a putative fa-
ther is precluded from pleading his concerns about non-paternity, from
obtaining a genetic test to verify his biological connection to the child, or
from introducing such test results as evidence of non-paternity, then he
might conclude that his interests are irrelevant to the court. He has lost
before the first hearing has begun. It would behoove government agencies to
recognize the short-sightedness of their current prosecution policy and its
potential adverse impact on long-term goals. If the D.C. government con-
218. Id. at 1846.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1875 (“If people feel unfairly treated by a government official or a court pro-
ceeding, they will perceive the source as less legitimate and, as a consequence, obey
its orders less frequently.”).
221. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515–16 (2011).
222. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
223. See Epstein, supra note 217, at 1876–77 (identifying a “genuine opportunity to state
his case” as important to a respondent’s sense of fairness in domestic violence cases).
Other such building blocks described by Professor Epstein include a defendant’s
belief that the process functions “in the absence of bias or prejudice” and that the
“authorities [are] engaging in respectful and ethical treatment [of the parties].” Id.
224. Id.
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tinues to argue that the interests of finality outweigh the interests of justice
such that post-rescission challenges should not be permitted,225 the fallout
may be an increasing distrust of the judicial system by the very individuals
whose compliance the government seeks in these paternity and support
cases.
B. Consider the Child’s Interests
It is clear that the D.C. government, like the state governments, has an
interest in keeping its rates of paternity establishment high so that it main-
tains eligibility for federal funding of its public benefits programs.226 It also
has an interest in securing and enforcing support orders to ensure that the
parents of a child are providing care owed to the child. Having an identifi-
able father on whom to serve notice of paternity and support cases is critical
to achieving those goals.227
Where the marital presumption is inapplicable, the in-hospital ac-
knowledgment of paternity program serves those interests. It enables gov-
ernment agents to identify both of a child’s biological parents, provides the
government with the parents’ addresses and other information to locate and
serve them with notice of any subsequent litigation related to child support,
and establishes a process by which the unwed father affirmatively commits
to supporting the child.228 Moreover, all of this is accomplished at the very
start of the child’s life, potentially cementing the parental relationships and
the familial unit in place for the duration of the child’s life.
For more effective procedural protections, however, these governmen-
tal interests need to be weighed against the interests of not only the putative
father, but also the minor child. This Article focuses on the shortcomings in
process related to paternity acknowledgments, and thus addresses the im-
pact of those shortcomings on the men who sign the acknowledgments.
However, when a court is facing a challenge to an acknowledgment based
on a man’s non-paternity, the interests of the child or children impacted by
the acknowledgment should be taken into consideration.
If a court determines that the signatory is a child’s legal father despite
the absence of a biological connection to the child, then presumably that
man would be entitled to visitation and custody rights as well.229 This could
225. See G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 13 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010).
226. See supra Part I (discussing the financial incentives behind paternity establishment).
227. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL METHODS,
supra note 38, at 5–6 (finding that a survey of states indicated that states have had
difficulties in notifying fathers of subsequent paternity and support cases).
228. See supra Part I.
229. D.C. CODE § 16-909.01(b) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
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have unsettling results: the very individual who sought to disestablish his
paternity may end up with momentous decision-making power in that
child’s life, such as deciding whether the child should undergo surgery or
attend a particular school.230 It is not outside the realm of possibility that
the signatory could become the sole custodian of the minor child. In M.M.,
the D.C. Family Court determined that a man with no biological connec-
tions to the child was her legal father and, because the child’s mother had
passed away, her only living parent.231 The putative father had acknowl-
edged paternity in an adjudication, but later genetic testing confirmed that
he was not biologically related to the child.232 Although it is unclear
whether the man was subsequently awarded custody of the child, his status
as the child’s legal father would provide him with the grounds to seek access
to the child.233
In Robertson, the D.C. court described this kind of outcome as a “legal
loophole” to the adoption process, which could permit a “biological stran-
ger” to step into the role of father.234 The signatory to an acknowledgment
would be handed “power and control” over the child but without the safe-
guards of adoption to protect the child.235 To enforce a so-called “fraudu-
lent” acknowledgment would require the court to “recognize a legal parent-
child relationship without first evaluating the individual’s fitness and
whether it is in the child’s best interest to do so.”236 Displeased with this
possibility, the Robertson court admonished the government for “essentially
placing monetary concerns above the best interest of the child” by seeking
to enforce a “fraudulent” paternity acknowledgment for child support pur-
poses.237 Given that the establishment of paternity has other weighty conse-
quences beyond child support, the government’s exclusive focus on financial
support for a minor child in these paternity and support cases seems my-
230. In D.C., there is a rebuttable presumption that the child’s parents will share legal
custody of the child. § 16-914(a)(2) (Westlaw). Legal custody includes the ability to
make decisions regarding the child’s health, education, and religious upbringing.
§ 16-914(a)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw).
231. M.M. v. T-M.M., 995 A.2d 164, 166–67 (D.C. 2010) (affirming lower court’s
finding that putative father was the child’s legal father based on his voluntary ac-
knowledgment of paternity).
232. M.M., 995 A.2d at 165.
233. M.M., 995 A.2d at 165-67. While it is not clear whether the putative father later
sought custody rights as the child’s legal father, the grandmother would have had the
burden to overcome the presumption that the legal father should have custody of the
child.
234. Robertson v. Anderson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2357, 2360 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 7, 2008)
235. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
236. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
237. Robertson, 136 DAILY WASH. L. REP. at 2360.
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opic. Indeed, the possibility of perverse consequences demonstrates the need
for paternity policies that better reflect the interests not only of the govern-
ment but of all the affected family members.238
State laws differ on the issue of when, if ever, a court may consider the
child’s interests in a paternity case. Some states, like Maryland, do not per-
mit a best interests of the child analysis in determining whether to order a
genetic test in a challenge to a paternity acknowledgment.239 By contrast, if
a court in New York makes a written finding that a genetic test is not in the
child’s best interests “on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman,” then no
such test may be ordered by the court even if the petitioner has proved that
the acknowledgment was signed under fraud, duress, or due to material
mistake of fact.240
California’s statutes provide for a best interests analysis only after a
genetic test indicates that the male signatory of a paternity acknowledgment
is not the child’s father. When that occurs, “the court may set aside the
voluntary declaration of paternity unless the court determines that denial of
the action to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity is in the best
interest of the child.”241 In order to make that determination, the court is
required to consider several factors, such as: the age of the child, the length
of time since the execution of the acknowledgment, the nature of the rela-
tionship between the putative father and the child, the putative father’s re-
quest that the parental relationship continue, notice by the biological father
that he does not oppose preservation of the putative father’s parental rela-
tionship, the benefit or detriment to the child in establishing biological par-
entage, whether the putative father’s conduct has impaired the court’s
ability to determine the identity of the biological father, and any additional
factors deemed by the court to be relevant.242 Similarly, the D.C. Code
includes a provision that requires, in certain but not necessarily all paternity
238. There are, of course, other children who could be affected by the outcome of a
challenge to a paternity acknowledgment—the biological children of the putative
father. Many low-income men have children with more than one partner and thus
are at risk of owing child support to multiple households. See Cancian et al., supra
note 16, at 152. Whether a court should have to consider these children’s possible
financial hardship if their father was obligated to pay support for a child who is not
biologically related to him is an important issue worthy of further discourse by the
courts and policymakers.
239. See Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 405–10 (Md. 2010).
240. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2009).
241. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575(b)(1) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. laws, all 2013–14
1st Ex. Sess. laws, and Res. c. 123 (S.C.A.3)).
242. § 7575(b)(1)(A)-(H) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. laws, all 2013–14 1st Ex.
Sess. laws, and Res. c. 123 (S.C.A.3)).
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cases, that the court when making a parentage determination give “due con-
sideration” to, among other things, “the child’s interests” “notwithstanding
evidence that the presumed parent is not the child’s genetic parent.”243
The best interests analysis may not necessarily weigh in favor of up-
holding an acknowledgment if the signatory is not the child’s biological
father. While the child’s financial stability is critical, she may have also an
interest in knowing her biological father. A child who does not know the
identity of her biological parent could be harmed if she develops medical
issues stemming from a genetic disorder. In W.F. v. K.J., the court noted
these potentially conflicting interests, on the one hand the “fundamental
right of a child . . . to know with as much certainty as possible the true
identity of his or her biological father” and on the other hand, the child’s
right “to continue to rely on the ‘father’ who has provided support (of
whatever nature) in his life thus far.”244 Undoubtedly, the weight of these
interests will vary from child to child and from case to case, further under-
scoring the need for a more nuanced approach to paternity disestablishment
procedures that permit judicial outcomes to reflect the weight of these
interests.
C. Create More Opportunities for Meaningful Deliberation
To avoid these challenges to paternity and the tangled web of interests
that accompany them, lawmakers should consider better ways to exclude
243. The statute provides in full:
A presumption created by subsection (a)(1) through (4) of this section may
be overcome upon proof by clear and convincing evidence, in a proceeding
instituted within the time provided in § 16-2342(c) or (d), that the pre-
sumed parent is not the child’s genetic parent. The Court shall try the
question of parentage, and may determine that the presumed parent is the
child’s parent, notwithstanding evidence that the presumed parent is not
the child’s genetic parent, after giving due consideration to:
(A) Whether the conduct of the mother or the presumed parent should
preclude that party from denying parentage;
(B) The child’s interests; and
(C) The duration and stability of the relationship between the child, the
presumed parent, and the genetic parent.
D.C. CODE § 16-909(b)(1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013). The provision was
added recently; it is unclear whether that statute is applicable to situations where an
acknowledgment of paternity has been executed by the putative father and mother.
It is also unclear whether a “child’s interests” is the same as the “best interest of the
child,” the standard for determining custody of a minor child. See § 16-914
(Westlaw).
244. See W.F. v. K.J., 128 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1045, 1046 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29,
1999).
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non-biological fathers from the population who sign the acknowledgments.
Reducing the number of erroneous signatories to acknowledgments can
only increase the likelihood that the acknowledgments will fulfill their pur-
pose of identifying a child’s biological parents. Short of requiring genetic
testing of all potential fathers, there is no perfect method for excluding non-
biological parents from the population of signatories. D.C. courts that have
grappled with subsequent legal challenges to paternity have zeroed in on the
quality of notice provided to the signatories as it relates to the “voluntari-
ness” of the signing, evaluating whether there was meaningful deliberation
by the signatories regarding the consequences of signing the document.245
Ensuring that the signatories have understood the impact of a signed ac-
knowledgment may encourage them to evaluate the accuracy of their beliefs
regarding parentage. But in their analysis of voluntariness and notice, the
D.C. courts do not necessarily examine whether the signatories were in-
formed about the availability of genetic testing or the potential irrelevance
of genetic test results subsequent to signing.246 The federally mandated dis-
closures for paternity acknowledgments—notice of the alternatives to, the
legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities that arise from,
signing the acknowledgment247—do not offer much guidance as to what
constitutes sufficient notice.
Another principle of voluntariness may provide needed guidance to
courts and policymakers on this issue. Informed consent, as familiar in the
hospital setting as a paternity acknowledgment, is a cornerstone of medical
patients’ rights.248 It is based on the idea that an individual’s right to deter-
mine what shall be done with her own body is so significant that she must
be given sufficient information about a proposed treatment’s possible conse-
quences such that her decision to undergo or forego a medical procedure is
an informed one.249 The principle incorporates the fact that most people are
245. See, e.g., G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 3–5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20,
2010); see also supra Part II.C.2.
246. In G. v. H., the court was wary of applying too stringent a standard when evaluating
the voluntariness to paternity acknowledgments, noting “it is doubtful that the same
standard that applies to guilty pleas and the waiver of constitutionally guaranteed
trial rights would apply to a paternity adjudication.” G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318,
slip op. at 3 n.1.
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(5)(C)(i) (Westlaw through P.L. 113–65 (excluding P.L. 113–54
and 113–59) approved Dec. 20, 2013).
248. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (“The root premise is the
concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body.” (internal citations omitted)).
249. Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561 (D.C. 1982).
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not themselves knowledgeable about these possible consequences and thus
rely on the knowledge and advice of their medical providers.250
Informed consent thus provides patients with the opportunity to re-
flect thoughtfully and carefully on weighty medical decisions, evaluating the
information provided by their healthcare professionals.251 In the context of
deciding whether a patient has made an informed medical decision, D.C.
courts examine whether a reasonable person in the individual’s position
would consider the information about the medical treatment material to his
decision.252 Information is material if a reasonable person “in what the phy-
sician knows or should know to be the patient’s position would be likely to
attach significance to the risks in deciding to accept or forego the proposed
treatment.”253
In the paternity acknowledgment setting, this informed consent stan-
dard suggests that policymakers ought to determine what information po-
tential signatories would consider critical in their decision to sign the
document.254 To ensure the decision to sign the acknowledgment is an in-
formed one, the requisite notice should include specific information about
the cost and availability of genetic testing,255 the process and deadline for
rescinding an acknowledgment, and the process for a post-rescission
challenge.
Of course, there are limits to the effectiveness of disclosure. When an
individual is inundated with information to the point of oversaturation,
information is no longer useful.256 Too many disclosures about the risks and
possible outcomes of signing an acknowledgment might make even those
men who are confident of their biological connection to the child wary
about signing. The balance should not swing so far in favor of disclosure
250. Crain, 443 A.2d 558 at 561 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972)).
251. See Crain, 443 A.2d 558 at 561 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972)) (“In order to make an intelligent and informed choice, a patient must first
obtain the facts necessary to make the decision from the physician.”).
252. Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 440 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Abbey
v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330, 332 (D.C. 1984)).
253. Crain, 443 A.2d at 562.
254. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. 1972) (listing topics “demand-
ing a communication of information” in the informed consent context).
255. See G. v. H., No. 2006-SUP-4318, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2010)
(“The failure to fully explain that a putative father had a right to genetic testing
would surely undercut the validity of an acknowledgment. . . . The very purpose of
advising the parties about the right to genetic testing is to provide an option for
paternity determination for those parties with questions regarding that issue.”).
256. See Crain, 443 A.2d 558 at 562 (“Not all risks need be disclosed; only material risks
must be disclosed.”); see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786 (noting that the scope of
the physician’s communications to the patient “must be measured by the patient’s
need”).
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that the entire paternity establishment program disintegrates. It is possible
that even if the proper amount of information and notice is given to indi-
viduals to ensure that their consent to sign is informed, the result may be
that fewer individuals sign the acknowledgments, thereby frustrating one of
the original goals of the paternity establishment process.257 If that is the
case, however, the establishment process itself deserves further scrutiny. No
government program should succeed on account of uninformed and, in
some cases, vulnerable participants.
D. Eliminate the Conclusive Presumption
Until a method is devised that will exclude all non-biological parents
from signing paternity acknowledgments, there will continue to be chal-
lenges to a signed acknowledgment’s validity. The disestablishment statutes
of the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions can only benefit from
further clarification about the procedures for such challenges. There are a
number of ways to ensure that there are proper safeguards in place so that
unmarried men with no biological ties to the child are able to present evi-
dence of their non-paternity in the proper forum. For instance, the process
for rescinding the acknowledgment should be made clear, including the
proper forum for rescission.258 The statutes should also include more infor-
mation about any time limitations on a post-rescission challenge. In recog-
nition of the uniqueness of paternity acknowledgments and the significance
of the rights and obligations conveyed by them, a disestablishment statute
should not incorporate by reference time restrictions or other aspects of a
final judgment rule.
A state’s disestablishment law should be clear that evidence of non-
paternity may be submitted in a post-rescission challenge to an acknowledg-
ment and permit the man an opportunity to request testing, if it has not yet
257. See supra Part I.
258. Other states’ statutes provide guidance on their rescission procedures. Delaware’s law
states that any proceedings to rescind or challenge an acknowledgement of paternity
“must be conducted in the same manner as a proceeding to adjudicate parentage.”
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-309 (Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013, chs. 1–185).
Florida’s law on challenges to paternity acknowledgment goes even further. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.18 (Westlaw through Ch. 272 (End) of the 2013 1st Reg. Sess. of
the 23d Leg.). Among other provisions, the Florida statute addresses the proper fo-
rum for such a petition, who must be served with the petition to disestablish pater-
nity, and what must be included in the petition. Notably, these include an affidavit
executed by the petitioner stating that newly discovered evidence relating to the pa-
ternity of the child has come to the petitioner’s knowledge since the initial paternity
determination or establishment of a child support obligation and the results of scien-
tific tests administered within 90 days of the filing of such petition excluding the
petitioner as the child’s father. § 742.18 (Westlaw).
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been performed.259 Determining the appropriate time in a disestablishment
case for ordering genetic tests is an issue best addressed by the various stake-
holders in a particular jurisdiction. States have taken different approaches.
For example, in Louisiana, the court must first determine at a hearing that
there is a “substantial likelihood” that fraud, duress, material mistake of fact
or error existed in the execution of the acknowledgment or that the person
who executed the authentic acknowledgment is not the biological father
before it can order genetic tests.260 In Michigan, a court must find that the
affidavit for revocation of an acknowledgment is “sufficient” before ordering
genetic testing.261 The affiant seeking revocation must state facts that consti-
tute mistake of fact, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation,
misconduct, or duress in signing the acknowledgment.262 Alternatively, a
state’s disestablishment law could ensure that all signatories have an oppor-
tunity to undergo genetic testing at some point in the child support case. In
Arkansas, any man who is ordered to pay child support based on an ac-
knowledgment but who did not receive the benefit of genetic testing is enti-
tled to one paternity test.263 Regardless of how D.C. or other jurisdictions
handle the admission of genetic tests, the relevant court should not vacate
an acknowledgment based solely on evidence of non-paternity. Instead, the
court should determine paternity on a case-by-case basis.264
259. Currently, in D.C. the court is obligated to order genetic testing where a party
moves for such relief if a legal finding of paternity was made by a court or adminis-
trative entity of competent jurisdiction where the party:
[H]as made a showing pursuant to Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule
60(b) or section 16-909(c-1) (or the applicable rule of another jurisdiction,
if the finding was made in another state) that supports setting aside the
judgment, and genetic or medical testing would aid in resolving whether
the judgment should be set aside.
D.C. CODE §16-2343(a)(2) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013). I would suggest that
a similar standard be employed for those whose paternity has been established by
voluntary acknowledgment. The statute exempts from genetic testing those cases in
which the parties have signed a voluntary acknowledgment and “have not made a
legally-effective rescission of the acknowledgment.” § 16-2343(a)(3)(Westlaw).
260. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:406(C)(2) (Westlaw through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
261. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1437 (Westlaw through P.A.2013, No. 277 (End)
of the 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Leg.).
262. § 722.1437 (Westlaw).
263. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(e) (Westlaw through End of 2013 Reg. and 1st Ex.
Sess., including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through Nov. 27,
2013).
264. See supra Part III.B. The D.C. Code does address certain situations where genetic
testing reveals that the individual thought to be the biological father is not in fact the
biological father. If there is a presumed parent but a genetic test identifies the “puta-
tive father” as the father of the child, the Code requires that the Court give “due
consideration” to the child’s interests, as well as “the duration and stability of the
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The application of statutes of limitations on post-rescission challenges
and the admissibility of genetic tests in paternity cases underscore how
troublesome the conclusive presumption of paternity is. The majority of the
D.C. courts that have permitted challenges to acknowledgments by non-
biological fathers have relied on the absence of voluntariness at the time of
signing, leaving the implications of the conclusive presumption and the ap-
plication of Rule 60(b) largely untouched.265 This may signal a reluctance to
enforce the presumption; it is likely easier for the courts to invalidate an
acknowledgment for lack of sufficient notice than to apply the conclusive
presumption in situations where enforcing the acknowledgment does not
seem to benefit the parties or the child. Moreover, the conclusive presump-
tion applies where men deny paternity, but not when they seek to claim
parenting responsibilities. One court noted that the purpose of the conclu-
sive presumption of parentage is “to establish paternity where the father is
either denying parentage or is otherwise unavailable to confirm it.”266 Un-
married men bear the brunt of the effects of the conclusive presumption,
since even married men have a lesser burden should they decide to challenge
their legal relationship to children born to their wives during a marriage: the
D.C. Code attaches only a rebuttable presumption of paternity in those
situations.267
This reliance on paternity acknowledgments with disregard for the sig-
natories’ biological connections is emblematic of our society’s inconsistent
notions of what it means to be a father. Professor Laura Oren has referred to
this as the “paternity paradox.” If a man desires to participate in a child’s life
as a caregiver, he may be required to provide proof of both a biological
connection with the child and also his attempts to maintain an actual par-
ent-child relationship.268 But where the state seeks to secure support from a
man, a biological connection alone will suffice as a basis for the support
obligation.269 And where a paternity acknowledgment exists, sometimes
relationship between the child, the presumed parent, and the putative parent.” D.C.
CODE § 16-2343.01 (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
265. But not all D.C. courts are willing to interpret the law so liberally; the court in F. v.
F. did not demonstrate concern with voluntariness and, perhaps unsurprisingly, con-
cluded that the lower court’s order for a genetic test was inappropriate in light of the
conclusive presumption. District of Columbia ex rel. F. v. F., No. 2006-SUP-3783,
slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2008).
266. See In re D.W., 27 A.3d 1164, 1168 n.6 (D.C. 2011) (emphasis in original).
267. D.C. CODE § 16-909(a)(1) (Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
268. Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology ‘Plus’
Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 47, 54–55 (2004) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983)).
269. Id. at 92–94.
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neither biology nor caregiving is necessary to establish the support obliga-
tion. A man’s signature on the acknowledgment can be sufficient to deter-
mine his support obligation.
The conclusive presumption should be eliminated in D.C. and in
other jurisdictions that still employ it in their paternity statutes. Federal
policy should be explicit: only a rebuttable presumption of paternity may
arise from a properly executed paternity acknowledgment. A rebuttable pre-
sumption of parentage will still create binding legal relationships between
minor children and those individuals who had sufficient information about
both their parentage and the consequences of signing. But a rebuttable pre-
sumption—instead of a conclusive one—can help to ensure that an individ-
ual who has been cast as a child’s parent is appropriate for that role by
allowing a court to evaluate not just the putative father’s biological connec-
tions to the child but also the signatory’s emotional relationship to the
child. A rebuttable presumption will permit court evaluation of challenges
that may not fit squarely within the current permissible exceptions to the
conclusive presumption: fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. In this
way, the presumption of paternity created by an acknowledgement may be
rebutted. As a family court in New York stated, “to do otherwise would
outrage common sense and reason.”270
The presumptive weight given to such acknowledgments should re-
flect the potential for misinformation and confusion. Federal and local pol-
icy should require a lesser presumption for voluntary acknowledgments of
paternity so that signatories can seek relief for mistakes made at the time of
signing without circumscribing the availability of such relief based on a ju-
risdiction’s definition of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact, or by placing bur-
densome time limitations on litigants. A rebuttable presumption would
acknowledge the possibility that, through no fault of his own, a man may
not be able to discover the truth of his paternity at the time that he attested
to that very fact on the acknowledgment. After all, an acknowledgement is a
far cry from a scientific test or even an adjudication of paternity; it is a
document whose accuracy depends almost entirely upon the couple’s
communications.
The law should make clear that evidence that there is no biological
connection between an unmarried man and a minor child is always relevant
to the issue of paternity. Considerations of the interests of the minor child
should be accounted for in determining the weight of a man’s non-paternity
270. McCoy v. Briggs, No. P-00253-08, 2009 WL 124433, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 20,
2009) (quoting In re Estate of Fay v. Hunter, 375 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 1978))
(“[I]f the truth can be discovered, and equity does not demand otherwise, the pre-
sumption of paternity should not be utilized to perpetuate a falsehood.”).
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in these cases. While the government can and should have interests in iden-
tifying the fathers of children born to unmarried parents, these interests
need to be carefully balanced given the importance of the interests of the
signatories and of the children affected by the establishment of paternity.
It appears that the federal government is aware, on some level, of the
shortcomings of the acknowledgment process. The Office of Child Support
Enforcement has stated that one of their guiding principles is that both
parents “are treated fairly and kept informed, and their concerns are recog-
nized.”271 That Office seeks to “[i]ncrease the use of expedited and adminis-
trative processes, including recourse to courts, ensuring that parents have
access to procedural justice” and to “[p]rovide easy access to genetic testing
for parents of children born outside of marriage.”272 But at the same time,
the Office uses the percentage of paternity established or acknowledged for
children born to unmarried parents as a measure of its success.273 If the
Office is serious about maintaining fairness and providing procedures re-
sponsive to the concerns of all parents, then it should carefully consider
whether relying on the “simple civil process” for establishing paternity in as
many cases as possible is in fact an accurate measure of success. Professor
Murphy noted, “easy paternity establishment has led to increased efforts to
disestablish paternity several years later.”274 What constitutes easy paternity
establishment now could come back to haunt state governments when sig-
natories attempt to undo those acknowledgments.
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that there are benefits to establishing paternity by ac-
knowledgment. Not only can children benefit from having their parents
sign a paternity acknowledgment,275 but also, parents can benefit from the
stability and security of familial relationships that the acknowledgment rep-
271. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2010-2014 5 (2013).
272. Id. at 11–12.
273. Id. at 8.
274. See Murphy, supra note 127, at 357.
275. See Leslie Jones Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Fami-
lies, 45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 169 (2011) (noting that fathers who signed an acknowledg-
ment are more likely to provide support, either in cash or as in-kind contributions,
to the mother and child during and after the pregnancy); see also Marcia J. Carlson
& Katherine A. Magnuson, Low Income Fathers’ Influence on Children, 635 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 103 (2011) (discussing how more involvement by
fathers in children’s lives may benefit children because it reinforces mothers’ parent-
ing and strengthens the cohesiveness of the family).
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resents.276 To paraphrase the Common Ground Project’s report on paternity
establishment practices, although the government should facilitate the use of
the acknowledgment of paternity, it must not mandate its use.277
A putative father who is led to believe he is the child’s biological father
but subsequently discovers he is not genetically related to the child deserves
an opportunity to be heard. Such an opportunity does not mean that a
court must grant his request for an acknowledgment to be invalidated; in-
deed, the court might subsequently determine that under the circumstances
the best resolution is to determine that the man is the legal father of the
child.278 What is important, however, is that a man is given a reasonable
opportunity to raise his concerns of non-paternity before a court, so that the
court can consider all of the relevant evidence before determining the man’s
legal relationship with the child.
A signed paternity acknowledgment should not override the biological
truth of paternity. In turn, that biological truth should not override the
existence of an acknowledgment or the existence of a stable, nurturing rela-
tionship between a putative father and a child. Instead, these different facets
of the connections between a man and a child—a signed acknowledgment,
biology, emotional bonds—should all be relevant to a court’s consideration
of paternity where the signatory is not the biological father.
Policymakers should review and revise their paternity laws to ensure
both that an unmarried man is given a reasonable opportunity to challenge
an erroneous acknowledgment and that the biological ties between a puta-
tive father and the child—or the lack thereof—are given due consideration
in a paternity challenge. If the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions
are willing to reconsider their paternity disestablishment laws in light of the
importance of both biological and emotional ties between parents and chil-
dren, the purpose of paternity acknowledgments can be preserved and the
interests of the unmarried men who have agreed to sign those acknowledg-
ments can be protected.
276. See Harris, supra note 275, at 171–72 (suggesting that acknowledgments “have be-
come a way that unmarried parents mark their feelings of commitment and family
membership”).
277. COMMON GROUND PROJECT, supra note 145, at 17.
278. See, e.g., In re William K. v. Ronald F., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 737, 745 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (affirming court decision to uphold acknowledgment of paternity where sig-
natory was not the biological father, noting that the lower court found that the best
interests of the child would not be furthered by setting aside the acknowledgment).
